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Abstract
Computing Science addresses the security of real-life systems by us-
ing various security-oriented technologies (e.g., access control solu-
tions and resource allocation strategies). These security technolo-
gies significantly increase the operational costs of the organizations in
which systems are deployed, due to the highly dynamic, mobile and
resource-constrained environments. As a result, the problem of de-
signing user-friendly, secure and high efficiency information systems
in such complex environment has become a major challenge for the
developers.
In this thesis, firstly, new formal models are proposed to analyse the
secure information flow in cloud computing systems. Then, the opac-
ity of workflows in cloud computing systems is investigated, a threat
model is built for cloud computing systems, and the information leak-
age in such system is analysed. This study can help cloud service
providers and cloud subscribers to analyse the risks they take with
the security of their assets and to make security related decision.
Secondly, a procedure is established to quantitatively evaluate the
costs and benefits of implementing information security technologies.
In this study, a formal system model for data resources in a dynamic
environment is proposed, which focuses on the location of different
classes of data resources as well as the users. Using such a model, the
concurrent and probabilistic behaviour of the system can be analysed.
Furthermore, efficient solutions are provided for the implementation of
information security system based on queueing theory and stochastic
Petri nets. This part of research can help information security officers
to make well judged information security investment decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Over recent decades, most business organizations have come to depend on infor-
mation technology for administrative, service and marketing needs. Meanwhile,
security and privacy have been a major concern when organizations design com-
puter network and systems. Much research on the information security has been,
traditionally, focused on the technology and products themselves. However, the
impact of these security technologies on business process and human behaviour
on the effectiveness of system have not been documented to date, although it has
been identified that the behaviour of users has a significant impact on information
security, and attacks associated with inappropriate behaviour of users are on the
rise and are posing a great threat [1; 2]. Therefore, organizations have to define
sets of security polices and use security technologies to enhance the security of
the computer network and systems in the organization.
Extensive investment in security policies and information security technologies
can lead to highly complex systems. A majority of today’s security infrastruc-
ture is static. This enforces security policies defined in advance within an IT or
business infrastructure, be relatively unchanged. This is no longer sufficient in
an environment that is highly dynamic. Therefore, an important development in
modern day security systems is recognition that means the system must achieve
the optimal performance and the trade-off between the security and cost can be
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balanced in the complex and dynamic environment.
Federated cloud systems increase the reliability and reduce the cost of compu-
tational support to an organization. The resulting combination of secure private
clouds and less secure public clouds impacts on the security requirements of the
system. Therefore, applications need to be located with different clouds, which
strongly affect the information flow security of the entire system.
Information security technologies protect the confidentiality of data resources
in the organization by providing access control. However, these security technolo-
gies might potentially increase the operational costs of the organizations. The
mobility of the users, the different type of data resources, in conjunction with
potential threats in different locations, make it difficult to analyse the risk of
data exposed in different environments, and the efficiency of information security
technologies.
1.2 Aims
The goal of this Thesis is to quantitatively analyse the distributed system. Firstly,
we will analyse the secure information flow in the cloud computing systems, and
quantitatively analyse the opacity in such systems. Secondly, we will quantita-
tively analyse the implementations of information security technologies, which
include the security of data resources, productivity loss in the organization, and
the cost of information help desks.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of the Thesis are summarised below:
- A lattice is proposed for federated cloud systems, and a flow-sensitive se-
curity model (fssm) is introduced to preserve the security properties and
prevent unauthorised information flow in a federated cloud system. The
fssm can be used to control information flow in service-oriented distributed
computing systems. Moreover, the opacity and observations of the fssm is
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analysed, and then a threat model for federated cloud computing is pro-
posed based on the observed actions of the system. Probabilistic models
are built to quantify a system’s observable behaviours under any given se-
curity preserving mechanisms. Observational equivalence, entropy, channel
capacity, Kullback-Leibler divergence and Jensen-Shannon divergence are
used to quantify the opacity in the could computing systems. This study
can be used to help cloud providers to make security related decision when
they design the system.
- A procedure (QEP) is established to quantitatively evaluate the benefits and
costs of implementing information security technologies in order to assist
security investors to make sensible security investment decisions. Stochastic
Petri nets models are used to simulate business processes, and quantify the
benefits and costs of implementing information security technologies. Enter-
prise Digital Rights Management (EDRM) technology is used as case study,
security metrics are defined as a standard to measure the impact of EDRM
products. Staff productivity reduction is measured by non-productive time
(NPT) and translated into monetary terms. NPT incurred by implementing
EDRM product is quantified by firing delay of Petri nets.
- A system model for data resources in the organization is proposed based on
the location of different classes of data resources as well as users. In this
model, the status of the data resources are divided into different classes to
analyse based on the security policy in the organization. Transition systems
are built to track the data resources and users in different locations. Using
such a model, the concurrent and probabilistic behaviours of the system can
be analysed. The modelling helps us move from the debate from discussion
of claims made by the information security technology vendors to a better
understanding of the effectiveness of information security technology and
security policies.
- An approximate solution for implementing information security technologies
is analysed and evaluated based on queueing theory, and a non-productive
time (NPT) function for implementing those technologies is also analysed
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and evaluated. Stochastic Petri nets models are built to simulate the busi-
ness processes. Multiple administrators in the information help desk is also
analysed, and a cost function is built to analyse the number of adminis-
trators in the system. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is applied to deter-
mine which of the parameters exerts the most influence on the NPT of
the organization, and help organization to develop a cost-effective strategy
for mitigating the negative impact of implementing information security
technologies. This study can help information security manager to know
the number of users a given system support, and the service capacity the
providers must provide at the system to satisfy a given number of users.
This study also can help the organization take actions toward reducing the
cost of the information security technologies.
1.4 Outline
The thesis is organized as flows:
Chapter 1 is introduction.
Chapter 2 provides the basic notions would be used in the thesis.
Chapter 3 presents a system model of information flow in federated cloud com-
puting system and opacity of the system.
Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis methodology for information se-
curity technology.
Chapter 5 presents a system model for data resources in the dynamic environ-
ments.
Chapter 6 presents the efficient solutions for implementing information security
technologies.
Chapter 7 is the related work.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary Material
In this part, the definition of the basic concepts and key notions are presented to
follow the technical content of this thesis.
2.1 Information Theory
2.1.1 Probability Theory
The basic definition and concepts of probability theory are reviewed in this part.
Probability theory [3] is concerned with the analysis of random experiences such
as tossing a coin or rolling a die. A random experiment is an experiment, which
can be repeated numerous times under the same conditions. The outcome of each
individual experiment must be independent, identically distributed and can not
be predicted with certainty. The relative frequency of an event for any random
experiment is called the probability of the event. Consider the experiment of
tossing a coin as an example, the experiment can yield two possible outcomes:
heads and tails, both with probability of one half in any long series of trials.
Probability theory normally treats discrete probability and continuous distribu-
tions separately. This thesis only considers discrete probability distributions. The
definition of a discrete probability distribution is as follows:
Definition 1. Discrete probability distribution Let D be a finite set. A
discrete probability distribution on D is a function f: D → [0, 1], such that∑
d∈D f(d) = 1.
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2.1.2 Shannon’s Measure of Entropy
In order to measure the information flow, the system is treated as a communi-
cation channel. Information theory introduced the definition of entropy (H), to
measure the average uncertainty in random variables. Shannon’s measures were
based on a logarithmic measure of the unexpectedness in a probabilistic event.
The unexpectedness of an event, which occurred with some non-zero probability
p was log2
1
p
. Therefore, the total information carried by a set of n events was
computed as the weighted sum of their unexpectedness:
H =
n∑
i=1
pi log2
1
pi
(2.1)
where, pi log2
1
pi
= 0 if pi = 0. This quantity is called the entropy of the set of
events.
Definition 2. Discrete random variable A discrete random variable X is a
surjective function, which maps events to values of a countable set, with each
value in the range having probability greater than zero, i.e. X : D → R(D),
where D is a finite set with a specified probability distribution, and R is the finite
range of X.
Shannon’s information theory [4] can be used to quantify the amount of infor-
mation a program may leak and the way in which this depends on the distribution
of inputs.
Definition 3. Shannon entropy X is a random variable, x ranges over the set
of values which X may take, and p(x) denotes the probability that X takes the
value x. The entropy of a discrete random variable X is denoted by H(X) and is
defined, in accordance:
H(X) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
1
p(x)
(2.2)
The entropy measures the average information content of the set of events.
In the extreme case of an event with probability 1, the entropy will be 0. On the
other hand, if the distribution of the events is uniform, the entropy is maximal.
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The definition of the entropy of a single random variable can be extended to
a pair of random variables, which is then called joint entropy.
Definition 4. Joint entropy The joint entropy H(X, Y ) of a pair of discrete
random variables (X, Y) with a joint distribution p(x,y) is defied as:
H(X, Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y)
1
log2 p(x, y)
(2.3)
Given two random variables X and Y , the conditional entropy captures de-
pendencies between random variables, when knowledge of one may change the
information about the another.
Definition 5. Conditional entropy The conditional entropy H(X|Y ) mea-
sures the uncertainty about X, given the knowledge of Y = y. It is defined as:
H(X|Y ) =
∑
y
p(y)H(X|Y = y) = H(X, Y )−H(Y ) (2.4)
If H(X|Y ) = 0, there is no uncertainty on X knowing Y ; and if X and Y are
independent, then H(X|Y ) = H(X), i.e., knowledge of Y does not change the
uncertainty on X.
The concept of mutual information is a measure of the amount of information
that one random variable contains about another. It implies the reduction in the
uncertainty of one random variable due to the knowledge of the other.
Definition 6. Mutual information Let p(x, y) denote the joint distribution of
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . The notion of mutual information between X and Y, I(X;Y )
is given by:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(2.5)
= H(X)−H(X|Y ) (2.6)
= H(Y )−H(Y |X) (2.7)
If X and Y are independent, then knowing X does not give any information
about Y and vice versa, so their mutual information is zero. At the other extreme,
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if X and Y are identical then all information conveyed by X is shared with Y ,
knowing X determines the value of Y and vice versa. As a result, in the case of
identity the mutual information is the same as the uncertainty contained in X
(or Y ) alone, namely the entropy of X (or Y : clearly if X and Y are identical
they have equal entropy).
2.2 The Information Lattices
2.2.1 Information Flow Model
An information flow model FM [5] as follows:
FM = (N,P, S,⊕,→)
where N = {a, b, . . . } is a set of logical storage object or information receptacles.
P = {p, q, . . . } is a set of processes. Processes are the active agents responsible
for all information flow. S = {A,B, . . . } is a set of security classes corresponding
to disjoint classes of information. Each object a is bound to a security class. Each
process p may also be bound to a security class.
The class-combining operator “⊕ ” is an associative and commutative binary
operator that specifies, for any pair of operand classes, the class in which the
result of any binary function on values from the operand classes belongs. The set
of security classes is closed under “⊕ ”.
A flow relation “ → ” is defined on pairs of security class. For classes A and
B, we write A→ B if and only if information in class A is permitted to flow into
class B. The security requirements of the model is: a flow model FM is secure if
and only if execution of a sequence of operations cannot give rise to a flow that
violates the relation “→ ”.
2.2.2 Information Lattice
A lattice for security concerns L = (L,≤) consists of a set L and a partial order
relation ≤ such that, for all l, l′ ∈ L, there exists a least upper bound l ⊕ l′ ∈ L
and a greatest lower bound l ⊗ l′ ∈ L (The lattice operation ⊕ and ⊗ are useful
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for computing the security level of information that is produced by combining
information at different security levels). The lattice is complete if each subset L′
of L has both a least upper bound
∐
L′ and a greatest lower bound
∏
L′ [5; 6].
When two elements l1 and l2 are ordered l1 ≤ l2, then the usage of information
at level l2 is at least as restrictive as usage of information at level l1.
Example 1. Figure 2.1 shows a structure satisfying the lattice property
Figure 2.1: A non-linear ordered lattice
which is derived from a non-linear ordering on the set of all subsets of a given
finite set X = {x, y, z}. In this figure, S = powerset(X), A → B iff A ⊆ B,
A ⊕ B = A ∪ B, A ⊗ B = A ∩ B, greatest lower bound ∏L′ = ∅, and least
upper bound
∐
L′ = X. This structure is suitable when X is regarded as a set
of properties and classes as combinations of properties from X. Information in
an object a is not permitted to flow into an object b unless b has at least the
properties of a.
2.3 Petri Nets
Petri net is a graphical and mathematical modelling tool for the formal description
of systems whose dynamics are characterized by concurrency, synchronization,
mutual exclusion and conflict [7]. Petri nets have been widely used for structural
modelling of work-flows and have been applied to a wide range of qualitative and
quantitative analyses [7; 8; 9; 10; 11].
Definition 7. The definition of a classic Petri nets:
A Petri net is a 5-tuple N = (P, T, F,W,Mo), where:
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P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, P is the set of places, pn is the name of each place;
T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}, T is the set transitions, tn is the name of each transi-
tion;
F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) is a set of arcs;
W : F → {1, 2, 3, . . . } is a weight function;
M0 : P → {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . } is the initial marking;
P ∩ T = ∅ and P ∪ T 6= ∅.
A Petri net consist of place, transition and arcs that connect them. In dia-
grams, places are drawn as circles, and transitions as rectangles. If W (x, y) ≥ 1
for some (x, y) ∈ (T × P ) ∪ (P × T ), then (x, y) is an arc leading from x to y.
The pre- and post-multiset of a transition t ∈ T are multisets of places, PREN(t)
and POSTN(t), respectively given by:
PREN(t)(p)
df
= W (p, t) and POSTN(t)(p)
df
= W (t, p)
for all p ∈ P . A marking of a net N is a multiset of places. Given a marking M
of N and a place p ∈ P , we say that p is marked, if M(p) ≥ 1 and that M(p)
is the number of tokens in p. In diagrams, M is represented by drawing in each
place p exactly M(p) tokens.
Transitions represent actions which may occur at a given marking and then
lead to a new marking. A transition t is enabled at a marking M , if PREN(t) ≤
M . In order for t to be enabled at M , for each place p, the number of tokens in p
under M should at least be equal to the total number of tokens that are needed
as an input to t, respecting the weights of the input arcs. If t is enabled at M ,
then it can be executed leading to the marking:
M ′
df
= M − PREN(t) + POSTN(t)
Hence the execution of t consumes from each place p exactly W (p, t) tokens and
produces in each place p exactly W (t, p) tokens. If the execution of t leads from
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M to M ′, we write M [t〉M ′. We call a marking M ′ reachable from marking M
if M = M ′, or if there exist transitions t1, . . . , tn and M1, . . . ,Mn−1(n ≥ 1) such
that:
M [t1〉M1 . . .Mi−1[ti〉Mi . . .Mn−1[tn〉M ′
Example 2. Figure 2.2 shows a classic Petri net model, the circles p1, p2, p3
Figure 2.2: A Petri net model
represent places, p1 contains one token and p3 contains two tokens, vertical lines
t1, t2 represent transitions.
2.3.1 Coloured Petri Nets
In standard Petri nets, there is only one kind of token and the state of a place
is described by an integer. In coloured Petri nets (CPNs), each token can carry
complex information or data [12]. To define coloured Petri nets formalism by
Jensen [12], we recall some syntax for writing the expression:
- Sms denotes the multi-set over a set S. A multi-set is the same as a set,
except that there may be multiple appearance of the same element.
- Type(v) denotes the type of a variable v.
- V ar(expr) denotes the set of variables in expression expr.
- A binding of a set of variables, V associating with each variable v ∈ V an
element b(v) ∈ Type(v).
- The value obtained by evaluating an expression, expr, in a binding, b de-
noted by expr〈b〉. V ar(expr) is required to be a subset of the variables
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of b, and the evaluation is performed by substituting for each variable
v ∈ V ar(expr) the value b(v) ∈ Type(v) determined by the binding.
Definition 8. CPN: A tuple CPN = (
∑
, P, T, A,C,G,E, I) be a Coloured
Petri Nets:
• ∑ is a finite set of non-empty sets, called colour sets.
• P is a finite set of places.
• T is a finite set of transitions.
• A is a finite set of arcs: P ∩ T = P ∩ A = T ∩ A = ∅.
• C is a colour function: P →∑.
• G is a guard function:
∀t ∈ T : [Type(G(t)) = B ∧ Type(V ar(G(t))) ⊆∑], B = {true, false}.
• E is an expression function:
∀a ∈ A : [Type(E(a)) = C(p(a))MS ∧ Type(V ar(E(t))) ⊆
∑
].
• I is an initialization function:
∀p ∈ P : [Type(I(P )) = C(p)MS].
The colour function C maps each place, p, to a colour set C(p). The guard
function G maps each transition, t, to an expression of type boolean. The arc
expression function E maps each arc, a, into an expression which must be of
type C(p(a))MS. The initialization function I maps each place, p, into a closed
expression which must be of type C(p)MS.
Definition 9. Workflow based on Coloured Petri nets (WFCP-nets): A
tuple CPN = (
∑
, P, T, A,C,G,E, I) is a WFCP-net if and only if:
• IN and OUT are subsets of P ; IN which has one element is a set of work-
flow start places, OUT may have one or many elements is a set of terminal
places formal description: IN,OUT ∈ P : [|IN | = 1; |OUT | ≥ 1] and ∀i ∈
IN, •i = ∅;∀o ∈ OUT, o• = ∅.
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• ∀x ∈ P ∪T ∧x /∈ IN ∧x /∈ OUT , x is on the path from i ∈ IN to o ∈ OUT .
• Tp is a category of transition T : ∀t ∈ T : Type(Tp(t)) ∈ TT ;
TT = {Auto, User, Event, T ime,Dumb}.
• The initialization function: I =
{
C(i)MS, p = i
∅, p 6= i
}
.
2.3.1.1 The Execution of CPN
The behaviour properties of the work-flow net reflect the run time aspects of work-
flow. The enactment of the nets depends on the interpretation of arc expression
and guard expression at runtime. The colour may be changed by application
agents or user iteration activities during runtime.
Definition 10. Transition enabled: An transition t is enabled in marking M
if the following property is satisfied:∑
∀p∈•t
E(p, t)〈b〉 ≤M(p)
G(t)〈b〉 = true
The expression evaluation E(p, t)〈b〉 yields the multi-set of C(p), if transition
t connects from p to t. Transition t should satisfy logic conditions.
Definition 11. Transition execution: As soon as enabled transition is com-
pleted, it triggers the enabling of other transitions. Formally, it changes the
marking (state) M1 to marking (state) M2, defined by:
∀p ∈ P : M2(p) = (M1(p)−
∑
E(p, t)〈b〉) +∑E(t, p)〈b〉
We can say M2 is directly reachable from M1 by the occurrence of the tran-
sition t in binding b, which is denoted as: M1[t > M2.
Definition 12. Flow terminal: An instance of flow terminates if the data
reaches all of the terminal places, formally: ∀o ∈ OUT,C(o) 6= ∅.
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2.3.2 Stochastic Petri Nets
For Petri nets, a firing delay can be associated with each transition; this firing
delay specifies the time that the transition has to be enabled, before it can actually
fire. If the delay is a random distribution function, the Petri net is called a
Stochastic Petri net.
Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) are stochastic extensions to Petri nets.
SANs consist of four primitive objects: places, transitions, input gates and output
gates. A place represents each state of the modelled system. Transitions represent
actions of the modeled system that take some specified amount of time to com-
plete. They are of two types: timed and instantaneous. Timed transitions have
durations that impact the performance of the modelled system. Instantaneous
transitions represent transitions that complete immediately when enabled in the
system. Input gates are used to control the enabling of transitions and define the
marking changes that will occur when a transition completes; and output gates
are used to define the marking changes that will occur when transitions complete.
Example 3. In figure 2.3, the circles p1, p2 represent places, and each
Figure 2.3: A stochastic Petri nets model
place contains a token, thick vertical line t represents timed transition, and red
triangle IG represents input gate (the triangle with its tip pointing to the left),
and dark triangle OG represents output gate (the triangle with its tip pointing
to the right).
If the input predicate of the input gate is: (p1 → Mark() == 1)&&(p2 →
Mark() == 1), then, the predicates return true, and t is enabled. Meanwhile, if
the output function is: p1 →Mark() + +; p2 →Mark() + +, then, in p1 and p2
the tokens will be increased by one more.
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Reward formalism: Reward models are used to specify measures of system
behaviour [13]. Reward model has two different reward structures: one is rate
rewards, that is, the rate at which reward accumulates while the process is in the
state during an interval of time; the other is impulse rewards, which is used to
count the number of times a transition fires during an interval of time.
Reward structure: The functions to express transition and marking oriented
reward structure of a SAN with places P and transitions A:
C : A → R, where for a ∈ A, Ca is the reward obtained due to completion of
transition a;
R : P(P,N) → R, where for v ∈ P(P,N), R(v) is the rate of reward obtained
when for each (p, n) ∈ v; there are n tokens in place p.
N is the set of natural numbers, P(P,N) is the set of all partial functions
between P and N. Impulse rewards are associated with transition completion
(via C) and rates rewards are associated with number of taken in sets of places
(via R).
Y[t,t+l] =
∑
v∈P(P,N)
R(v)M
v
[t,t+l] +
∑
a∈A
CaN
a
[t,t+l]
In this function, reward accumulated is related to the number of times each
transition completes and time spent in particular markings during an interval of
time [t, t + l]. M v[t,t+l] represents the total time that the SAN is in a marking
such that for each v ∈ P(P,N), there are n tokens in p during [t, t + l]. Na[t,t+l]
represents the number of completion of transition a during [t, t+ l].
2.4 Queueing Networks
Consider a system where jobs arrive, remain for some time, and then depart. The
system has been running for a long time and its behaviour no longer exhibits any
trends. It continues to change state, the number of jobs in it continues to vary,
but the probability of observing it in any given state is no longer a function of
time. Therefore, we call the systems are in steady state [14].
Definition 13. Little’s Law Suppose we observe the queueing process for an
interval of time, the system reaches steady state. The arrival rate, λ, does not
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change with time and is equal to the departure rate. The average number of jobs
in the system, L, does not change. The average interval, W , between the arrival
of a job and its departure does not change. The following relation holds:
L = λW (2.8)
A queueing network can be thought of as a connected directed graph whose
nodes represent service centres. A network without external arrivals and without
departures, but with a fixed number of jobs circulating forever among the nodes,
is called “closed queueing network” [14].
Suppose that a network is in steady state. Let λi be the total average number
of jobs arriving into, and departing from, node i per unit time. Some of the
incoming jobs be external with rate γi. On the average, λj jobs leave node j per
unit time, a fraction qji go to node i. Thus, the rate of traffic from node j to
node i is λjqji, (j = 1, 2, . . . , N). Figure 2.4 shows the arrives and departures at
node i.
Figure 2.4: Incoming and outgoing traffic at node i [14].
Expressing the total arrival rate at each node as a sum of external and internal
traffic rates, we get:
λi = γi +
N∑
j=1
λjqji ; i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2.9)
These are know as the “traffic equations” of the network. The condition for
stability of the network depends on the offered loads at all nodes, which in turn
depend on the parameters bi. The following must be hold:
ρi = λibi < 1 ; i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2.10)
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where, λi and bi be the arrival rate and the average service requirement at node
i.
Example 4. In figure 2.5, the external arrival process has rate γ, after
Figure 2.5: A single-node network with feedback [14].
completing service, jobs return to the queue with probability q, and leave the
system with probability 1 − q. There is one traffic equation, which determines
the total arrival rate λ:
λ = γ + λq
This yields λ = γ
1−q . If the average service time is b, then the condition for
stability of this system is γb < 1 − q. The traffic rate along the feedback arc is
λq = γq
1−q . The rate of departures from the network is λ(1− q), which is equal to
the external arrival rate γ.
2.5 Markov Chains and Processes
A stochastic process is a mathematical model used to describe the evolution of
an empirical process or system which exhibits some probabilistic behaviour. Such
processes can be defined by the set of all possible states that they may reach and
the set of probabilities that specify the transitions between possible states. A
stochastic process is defined as follows:
Definition 14. A stochastic process is a family of random variables {X(t), t ∈
T} defined over the same probability space and taking values in the set S. The
parameter t denotes time and it is used to index each random variable. S contains
the values which can be obtained by the stochastic process, known as states, and
therefore S is called the state space of the process
If the state space is discrete then the corresponding stochastic process is said
to be a discrete-state process or chain. If state space is continuous, it is called
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a continuous space process. The parameter set T , i.e., the values of t, can be
either discrete or continuous. in the later case the stochastic process is called a
continuous-time process while in the former case it is referred to as discrete-time
process or sometimes as a stochastic sequence.
2.5.1 Markov Chains
Let X = {Xt : t = 0, 1, . . . } be a Markov chain whose state space maybe finite or
infinite. The Markov property says, that given the state of X at time t, its state
at time t+ 1 is independent of the states at times 0, 1, . . . , t− 1:
P (Xt+1 = j|X0, X1, . . . , Xt) = P (Xt+1 = j|Xt) (2.11)
The evolution of the Markov chain is completely described by the “one-step tran-
sition probability”, qi,j(t), that the chain will move to state j at time t+ 1, given
that it is in state i at time t:
qi,j(t) = P (Xt+1 = j|Xt = i) ; i, j, t = 0, 1, . . . (2.12)
The one-step transition probability do not depend on the time instant:
qi,j(t) = qi,j ; i, j, t = 0, 1, . . . (2.13)
Markov chains which satisfy (2.13) are called to be “time-homogeneous” [14].
A Markov chain is characterized by its “transition probability matrix”, Q,
containing the one-step transition probability:
Q =

q0,0 q0,1 q0,2 . . .
q1,0 q1,1 q1,2 . . .
...
...
...
qi,0 qi,1 qi,2 . . .
...
...
...

(2.14)
where, the indices range over the state space. All row sums of the transition
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probability matrix are equal to 1:
∞∑
j=0
qi,j = 1 ; i = 0, 1, . . . (2.15)
Example 5. A machine can be in one of two possible states: broken or
Figure 2.6: A machine with two possible states
operative (0 or 1, respectively) [14]. If it is broken at time t, it will be broken or
operative at time t+1 with probability 0.3 and 0.7, respectively. If it is operative
at time t, it will be broken or operative at time t+1 with probability 0.1 and 0.9,
respectively (t = 0, 1, . . . ). This behaviour satisfy the Markov property. Figure
2.6 shows the two-state Markov chain, and the transition probability matrix is:
Q =
(
0.3 0.7
0.1 0.9
)
2.6 Labelled Transition System
Definition 15. Sequences The set of finite sequence over a set A is denoted
by A∗, and the empty sequence is denoted by . The length n of a finite sequence
λ = l1, . . . , ln is denoted by LEN(λ). The projection of λ onto a set B ⊆ A,
denoted by λ|B, is formed by stripping from λ all the elements that are not in B.
The concatenation of sequences λ1, . . . , λn will be denoted by λ1 . . . λn.
Definition 16. Labelled transtion system A Labelled transition system is a
tuple:
LTS
df
= (S, L,∆, S0)
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where S is the set of states, L is the set of labels, ∆ ⊆ S×L×S is the transition
relation, and S0 is the non-empty (finite) set of initial states. If only considering
deterministic labelled transition systems, for any transitions (s, l, s′), (s, l, s′′) ∈
∆, it is the case that s′ = s′′.
A run of the labelled transition system is a pair (s0, λ), where s0 ∈ S0, and
λ = l1 . . . ln, (n ≥ 0) is a finite sequence of labels such that there are states
s1, . . . , sn satisfying (si−1, li, si), for i = 1, . . . , n. The state sn is denoted by s0⊕λ,
and is called reachable from s. s0 ⊕ λ is well-defined since LTS is deterministic,
and that s0 ⊕  = s0.
The set of all runs is denoted by RUN(LTS), and the language generated by
LTS is defined as:
L(LTS)
df
= {λ | ∃s0 ∈ S0 : (s0, λ) ∈ RUN(LTS)}
A marked Petri net PN
df
= (P, T, F,W,M0) has a finite set of initial markings M0.
It generates the labelled transition system:
LTSPN
df
= (M,L,∆,M0)
where M is the set of all the markings reachable from the marking in M0, T is
the set of labels, and ∆ is defined by (M, t,M ′) ∈ ∆ iff M [t〉M ′. The language
of PN is that of LTSPN .
2.7 Observability and Opacity
Opacity has been shown to be a promising technique for describing and unifying
security properties. The essential ideal is that a predicate is opaque if an observer
of the system will never be able to determine the truth of that predicate [15; 16].
LTS
df
= (S, L,∆, S0) is a labelled transition system, and Obs be a set of
elements called observables, and Obs
df
= Obs ∪ {}.
Definition 17. Static observation function obs : RUN(LTS) → Obs∗ is a
(label-based) observation function. It is called static if there is a map obs′ : L→
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Obs such that for every run (s, λ) = (s, l1 . . . ln) of LTS,
obs(s, λ)
df
= obs′(l1)obs′(l2) . . . obs′(ln)
obs′ is allowed to return  which means that one can model invisible actions.
Based on the observation function, an observer might establish property PROP
(a predicate over system runs) for some run having only access to the result of
the observation function. The PROP is identified by its characteristic set: the
set of runs for which it holds. Given an observed execution of the system, we
would find out whether the fact that the underlying run belongs to PROP can
be deduced by the observer.
Definition 18. The formalisation of opacity Let obs be an observation func-
tion and PROP be a predicate PROP over RUN(LTS). Then PROP is opaque
w.r.t. obs if, for every run (s, λ) ∈ PROP , there is a run (s′, λ′) /∈ PROP , such
that obs(s, λ) = obs(s′, λ′). In other words,
obs(RUN(LTS) ∩ PROP ) ⊆ obs(RUN(LTS \ PROP ))
Moreover, PROP is called final-opaque if there is a predicate PROP ′ such
that for every run (s, λ) = (s, l1 . . . ln) of LTS, PROP (s, λ)
df
= PROP ′(σ), where
the following hold: σ
df
= s⊕ (l1 . . . ln). Final-opacity models situations where the
final result of a computation needs to be secret.
Proposition 1. Let PROP and PROP ′ be two predicates over the runs of a
labelled transition system such that PROP ′ implies PROP . If PROP is opaque
w.r.t. an observation function obs then PROP ′ is also opaque w.r.t. obs.
2.8 Project Economics
For corporations and organizations to make sound decisions on the implementa-
tion of a project, all the associated costs and benefits over a multi-year period
have to be taken into account. The concept of net present value (NPV) from eco-
nomics, project management and decision making science is adopted to quantify
the value of an implementation project. NPV takes the time value of money into
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consideration. The basic concept is that money spent or obtained in the future
will have a discounted value than money spent or obtained in the present [17].
NPV calculation is based on the principle of discounting; all the future cash flows
are discounted back to the present time, which means one pound today is worth
(1 + i)t pound at time t in the future.
NPV (i, T ) = −K +
T∑
t=0
Rt − Ct
(1 + i)t
In which, −K is a capital costs now (K at time zero), t is the time of the cash
flow, Rt is the benefits return of year t, Ct is ongoing costs which is the cost of
year t, i is the discount rate. Organizations usually have its own defined discount
rate, although this discount rate is in general tied to the national interest rate.
NPV is one of the most widely used decision making criteria. If the NPV of a
project is positive, this project will generate positive cash flow to the organization
over a certain period, therefore, is beneficiary or profitable to the organization.
However, when the capital of an organization with a portfolio of many profitable
projects (NPV > 0) is constrained, not all the project with a positive NPV can
be invested. The organization usually set a value larger than 0; projects with
higher NPV usually have higher priorities for investment.
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Chapter 3
Information Flow Security in
Cloud Computing Systems
The extent and importance of cloud computing is rapidly increasing due to the
ever increasing demand for internet services and communications. Instead of
building individual information technology infrastructure to host databases or
software, a third party can host them in its large server clouds. However, large
organizations may wish to keep sensitive information on their more restricted
servers rather than in the public cloud. This has led to the introduction of feder-
ated cloud computing (FCC) in which both public and private cloud computing
resources are used [18].
A federated cloud is the deployment and management of multiple could com-
puting services with the aim of matching business needs. Data, services, and
software are required to be allocated in different clouds for both security and
business concerns. Although federated cloud systems (FCSs) can increase the
reliability and reduce the cost of computational support to an organization, the
large number of services and data on a cloud system creates security risks. As
a result, it is very hard for an organization to track and control the information
flow in the system. It is therefore necessary to develop a formal model describing
the information flow security within an FCS, making the information and data
traceable.
In this chapter, we will introduce a transition system representation to capture
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the information flow in a federated cloud system, and investigate the opacity and
observations of the cloud computing system. In addition, we will quantitatively
analyse the opacity of such system.
3.1 Information Lattices
In this section, we introduce security lattices for the components of a cloud system
as well as for sets of individual clouds.
The information lattice is represented in Section 2.2, in this part, we will
assume that the origin of a federated cloud is a set C of single deployment clouds.
Moreover, S will denote subjects (e.g. services, programs and processes), and
O will denote objects (e.g. resources and messages). Subjects and objects will
jointly be referred to as entities, and their set will be denoted by E.
Following [6], at the centre of our approach is a complete security lattice
Lsec = (Lsec,≤sec) with the ordering ≤sec on security levels in Lsec.
We will assign a security (or confidentiality) level l(e) ∈ Lsec to any entity
e ∈ E which will in practice be related to the degree of security of the contents
of e. Moreover, each cloud c ∈ C will also be assigned a security level l(c) ∈ Lsec.
Intuitively, l(c) specifies the highest allowed security level of the entities located
in c.
3.2 System Model
Information flow security is concerned with the way in which secure information
is allowed to flow through a computing system. Intuitively, the flow is consid-
ered secure if it adheres to a specified security policy. In this section, a formal
model is introduced for capturing the information flow in federated cloud comput-
ing systems. The state transitions of the model can then be analyzed to verify
that they satisfy conditions of a given security policy such as non-interference
properties [19], Bell-Lapadula rules [20] for confidentiality considerations, Biba
policies [21], and user-specified policies.
We now introduce a framework for security models of federated cloud comput-
ing systems based on guarded actions, each guard capturing security constraints
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introduced in order to ensure the security properties of interest.
Throughout this section, we assume that C and E are finite non-empty sets of
respectively clouds and entities (or entity names), and Lsec is a security lattice as
defined above. We also assume that there is a mapping l : C∪E→ Lsec assigning
security levels to individual clouds and entities.
In what follows, an entity can have different copies, and each of these copies
can have a different security level and may reside in a different cloud. We further
allow multiple copies of a single entity to be present in a single deployment cloud.
As a result, in what follows, we will mean by a state any finite multiset s over
the set E×C×Lsec. Thus, for example, if s(a, c, 2) = 4 then we know that in the
current state there are 4 copies of entity a with security level 2 residing in cloud
c. The elements of E× C×Lsec will be referred to as actual entities. We will say
that an actual entity (e, c, l) is present in state s if s(e, c, l) > 0.
Definition 19 (fssm). A flow-sensitive security model is a pair
FSSM = (A, sinit) , (3.1)
where A is a finite set of actions and sinit is an initial state. It is assumed that
each action is a triple
φ = (in, out,Σ) (3.2)
such that the first two components
in = (e1@c1, . . . , ek@ck) and out = (ek+1@ck+1, . . . , ek+m@ck+m)
are finite tuples of entity-cloud pairs and Σ ⊆ Lk+msec is a (security) guard.
Note that security guards can be provided in the form of a suitable predicate
over k + m variables and suitable constants (such as security levels of given
clouds).1
Definition 20 (single action execution). An action φ as in (3.2) is σ-enabled at
1 One may extend the class of allowed action types to include, for example, checking of
absence of certain entities.
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state s if σ = (l1, . . . , lk+m) ∈ Σ is a tuple of security levels such that1
φinσ = {(e1, c1, l1), . . . , (ek, ck, lk)} ≤ s .
Such an action can then be σ-executed leading to a new state2
s′ = s− φinσ + φoutσ ,
where φoutσ = {(ek+1, ck+1, lk+1), . . . , (ek+m, ck+m, lk+m)}. We denote this by s φ:σ−→
s′. The step semantics describe how the individual steps of a computation take
place in the system.
The last definition captures the enabling and execution of a single action. The
next definition lifts this to any group of actions executed simultaneously.
Definition 21 (multiset action execution). Let Φ = {φ1 : σ1, . . . , φn : σn} be a
multiset such that each φi is an action σi-enabled at state s and, moreover,
Φin = (φ1)
in
σ1
+ · · ·+ (φn)inσn ≤ s .
Then Φ can then be executed leading to a new state
s′ = s− Φin + Φout ,
where Φout = (φ1)
out
σ1
+ · · · + (φn)outσn . We denote this by s
Φ−→ s′. The step
semantics here describe how the overall results of the executions are obtained.
Definition 22 (reachable states). The set of reachable states of the flow-sensitive
security model as in (3.1) is the minimal set of states RS containing sinit and
such that if s ∈ RS and s Φ−→ s′, for some Φ, then s′ ∈ RS.
We have defined general notions related to the syntax and operational seman-
tics of a flow-sensitive security model. It is then straightforward to capture the
basic notion of security across the federated cloud.
1Note that ≤ denotes multiset inclusion.
2Note that ‘−’ and ‘+’ denote multiset subtraction and addition, respectively.
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Definition 23. A state s is secure if, for every actual entity (e, c, l) present in s,
l ≤sec l(c). A flow-sensitive security model as in (3.1) is secure if all its reachable
states are secure.
Intuitively, a state is secure if all copies of entities present in the state reside
in clouds without causing security violation. One can formulate a general security
policy guaranteeing the security of a flow-sensitive security model. Such a policy
is formulated by placing a suitable condition on the security guards present in
the model.
Theorem 1. Let FSSM be a flow-sensitive security model as in (3.1) such that,
for every action φ as in (3.2), {ck+1, . . . , ck+m} ⊆ {c1, . . . , ck} and if (l1, . . . , lk+m) ∈
Σ then, for every i = k + 1, . . . , k +m:∐
{p>k|cp=ci}
lp ≤sec
∏
{r≤k|cr=ci}
lr . (3.3)
Then FSSM is secure provided that its initial state is secure.
Proof : Let l1, . . . , lk+m ∈ Lsec, if p > k and r ≤ k, according to (3.2), we
know lp and lk represent the security levels of the entities which are associated
with φoutσ and φ
in
σ , respectively.
Note that cp = ci and cr = ci so it implies that cp = cr. Then we have
lp ≤sec lr, i.e., if two entities are allocated on the same cloud, the security levels
of the entities which are associated with φoutσ has lower security status than φ
in
σ .
Therefore, we can say the least upper bound
∐
of lp is lower or equal than the
greatest lower bound
∏
of lr, then we can obtain (3.3).
The above result can only be applied in specific cases; in general, we need
to verify that a given system specification yields a secure system. In the next
section, we will outline how coloured Petri nets can be used to provide a suitable
analytical tool.
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Figure 3.1: The medical research application example from [18].
3.3 Coloured Petri Nets Model
Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) can be used to model concurrent systems, includ-
ing information flow in FCSs. In particular, Petri net theory provides powerful
analysis techniques which can be used to verify the correctness of workflow pro-
cedures [22]. Transitions in Petri nets can be interpreted as occurrences of events
or executions of tasks in a system. In our representation of FCSs in CPNs, the
relations between events are explicit, and the representation of the system can
alleviate the state explosion problem [23].
CPNs allow one to model multi-type cases in a process specification [12], which
can model different entities of an FCS. Each token can carry complex information
and/or data. Arc expressions and multiple exits can be used to model the various
workflow logics. Moreover, guard functions associated with transitions can be
used to specify security-related conditions.
3.3.1 Case Study
As a case study adapted to our purposes, we will use a simplified version of the
federated cloud system of [18]. It is a medical research application in which data
from a set of patients’ heart rate monitors is analysed, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Informally, the process can be described as follows:
- The input data (d0) is a file with a header identifying the patient (name
and patient number), followed by a set of heart rate data recoded over a
period of time;
- A service (s1) strips off the header, leaving only the heart rate data (d2);
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Figure 3.2: A workflow of the case study in [18].
Table 3.1: Security level of clouds, services and data in the FCS of [18].
Clouds Security level Services Security level Data Security level
c0 0 s1 1 d0 1
c1 1 s3 0 d2 0
d4 0
- A second service (s3) analyzes the heart rate data, and produces results
(d4).
Analyzing the heart rate data (s3) is costly and would benefit from a cheap,
scalable resources that are available on public clouds. However, considering that
storing medical records on a public cloud can breach confidentiality, some orga-
nizations prefer to deploy the whole workflow on a secure private cloud. Such a
policy may overstretch the limited resources available on the private cloud, re-
sulting in degraded performance and negative impact on other applications. To
address this problem, the partitioning of the application between a private cloud
and a public cloud could provide a better solution.
In our case study, we use two clouds, one public cloud c0 and one private cloud
c1. The proposed workflow operates on sensitive medical data processed on the
private cloud, and anonymised data that can be deployed on the public cloud.
Figure 3.2 is a workflow which is derived from Figure 3.1, with the security
settings shown in Table 3.1, where {c0, c1} are the clouds in the system, {s1, s3}
are the services, and {d0, d2, d4} are the data.
After determining valid mappings of services and data to clouds based on the
Bell-Lapadula rules, the workflow in Figure 3.2 leads to six valid partitionings.
The partitioning chosen for this case study is shown in Figure 3.3: {s1, d0, d2} are
Figure 3.3: A valid workflow partitioning for the FCS of [18].
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services and data deployed on cloud c1 whose security level is 1, while {s3, d2, d4}
are deployed on cloud c0 whose security level is 0.
3.3.2 CPN model
serv(sn, sc, ls)
serv(sn, sc, ls)
if #1 (dn, dc, ld) = d(0)
then 1`data(d(2), dc, ld2)
else empty
serv(sn, sc ,ls)
data(dn, dc, ld)
if #1 (dn, dc, ld) = d(2)
then 1`data(d(4), sc, ld4)
else empty
data(dn, dc, ld)
serv(sn, sc, ls)
t2
[#1(dn, dc, ld) = d(2)
andalso #1 (sn, sc, ls) = s(3)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #3 (sn, sc, ls)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #2 (sn, sc, ls)]
t1
[#1(dn, dc, ld) = d(0)
andalso #1(sn, sc, ls) = s(1)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #3 (sn, sc, ls)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #2(sn, sc, ls)]
cloud0
1`serv((s(3), c0, ls3))
entity
cloud1
1`data((d(0), c1, ld0))++
1`serv((s(1), c1, ls1))
entity
· val ls1 = 1; · closet lsec = int with 0..1;
· val ls3 = 0; · closet dName = index d with 0..4;
· val ld0 = 1; · closet dataInfor = product dName * lsec * lsec ;
· val ld2 = 0; · colset sName = index s with 1..3 ;
· val ld4 = 0; · colset servInfor = product sName * lsec * lsec ;
· val c1 = 1; · colset entity = union data: dataInfor + serv: servInfor;
· val c0 = 0; · var sn: sName;
· var dn: dName; · var ld, ls, dc, sc: lsec;
Figure 3.4: CPN model (including the colour sets) for a federated cloud system.
Based on the FCS model outlined above, we built a CPN model capturing the
information flow of the FCS in the case study, shown in Figure 3.4.
The model provides an abstract view of CPN model of the chosen workflow
partitioning of the FCS. It has two places cloud1 and cloud0, which represent the
two clouds, and two transitions, t1 and t2. Places store the entities of the system,
which have the type entity as the colour set (describing the data are needed to be
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processed in the system). The declarations of the colour sets in Figure 3.4 tell us
that entity is a union type, which corresponds to a datatype in Standard ML, with
the values being either data (data) or services (serv). data and serv have an asso-
ciated product colour sets which allows one to distinguish each individual entity.
Thus, the type entity contains the values {data((d(0), 1, 1), serv(s(1), 1, 1), . . . }.
Each token has a colour which has three fields. The first field is an element of
dName or sName, and thus it is d0 or d1 or d2 or d3 or d4 or s1 or s2 or s3, which
specifies the name of the data/services in the system. The second element is an
integer which specifies the security level of the cloud where the service/data is
located. The third element is also an integer, specifying the security level of the
service/data. Each of the two transitions, t1 and t2, represents a move from one
state to the next.
3.4 Opacity in Cloud Computing Systems
Observing behaviour patterns of users can lead to leakages of secure information.
Information sharing means that the behaviour of one cloud user may appear
visible to other cloud users or adversaries, and observations of such behaviours
can potentially help adversaries to build covert channels. Opacity is a uniform
approach for describing security properties expressed as predicates [16; 24; 25]. A
predicate is opaque if an observer of the system is unable to determine the truth
of the predicate in a given run of the system. In this section, we will discuss one
of the versions of opacity in the context of workflows executed on federated cloud
computing systems.
Let FSSM = (A, sinit) be a flow-sensitive security model as in (3.1). A run of
FSSM is a finite sequence
ξ = Φ1 . . .Φn (n ≥ 0) (3.4)
such that there are states sinit = s1, . . . , sn+1 satiafying si
Φi−→ si+1, for
i = 1, . . . , n. The set of all runs of FSSM will be denoted by RUN (FSSM ).
To model the different capabilities for observing the system modelled by
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FSSM one can use observation functions :
obs : RUN (FSSM )→ Obs∗ (3.5)
where Obs be a set of observables. In what follows, we consider a state obser-
vation function obs for which there is a map obs′ associating obs′(Φ) ∈ Obs∪ {}
with every Φ as in Definition 21, in such a way that
obs(ξ) = obs′(Φ1) . . . obs′(Φn) (3.6)
for every run ξ = Φ1 . . .Φn in RUN (FSSM ).
Given the observation function obs, we are now interested in whether an ob-
server can establish a property γ (a predicate over system runs) for a run of
FSSM having only access to the result of the observation function. As one can
identify γ with its characteristic set, i.e. the set of all those runs for which it
holds, we would want to find out whether the fact that the underlying run be-
longs to γ ⊆ RUN (FSSM ) can be deduced by the observer on the basis of an
observed execution of the system. Moreover, we are interested in the final opacity
predicate γZ , defined as the set of all the runs ξ as in (3.4) satisfying sn ∈ Z, for
some set of states Z [16]. Intuitively, this means that we are interested in finding
out whether an observed run of the system represented by FSSM ended in one
of secret (or sensitive) states belonging to Z. Note that we are not interested
in establishing whether the underlying run does not belong to γ; to do this, we
would consider the property γ¯ = RUN (FSSM ) \ γ.
We then say that γ is opaque w.r.t. obs if, for every run ξ ∈ γ, there is another
run ξ ∈ γ¯ such that obs(ξ) = obs(ξ′). In other words, if all runs in γ are covered
by runs in γ¯:
obs(γ) ⊆ obs(γ¯) .
3.4.1 Case Study
The scenario of this case study involves three clouds (W , X, and Y ) and a
number of processes, which all together form an e:shop application. Cloud X
hosts a web portal e:win; Cloud W hosts two providers, e:prov1 and e:prov2 ;
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Figure 3.5: Information flow in a cloud based e:shop.
and cloud Y hosts a payment handling site, e:pay , and an internet bank, e:bank .
The functionality of the e:shop is built around the transmission of information
between the various predefined process participants, such as the providers and
bank.
Figure 3.5 shows the basic structure of the execution scenario for the e:shop.
The role of each of the processes is as follows:
- client tries to buy a product online, accessing to cloud based retail appli-
cations through a web browser.
- e:win is a web portal which provides a platform for trading.
- e:prov1 and e:prov2 supply products traded by e:shop.
- e:pay is an agent through which client can make online payment and trans-
fer money between bank accounts.
- e:bank can handle payments and deposits through the e:pay agent.
The generic behaviour of e:shop is shown in Table 3.2. It starts with a pur-
chase request sent from client to e:win. The request is forwarded to the product
providers, e:prov1 and e:prov2 , who reply with the relevant product informa-
tion. e:win forwards the received information to client , who selects one of the
two products and sends the decision back to e:win. Then e:win forwards the de-
cision to e:pay which contacts client asking for payment details. After receiving
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Table 3.2: The sequence of interactions between the components of the e:shop system.
Entities (subject) Actions Sender Receiver (ob-
ject)
1 client’s request Φ1 client e:win
2 forward client’s request Φi2 e:win e:provi (i=1,2)
3 product’s information Φi3 e:provi (i=1,2) e:win
4 forward product’s information Φ4 e:win client
5 choose products Φ5 client e:win
6 forward the client to the payment Φ6 e:win e:pay
7 client’s information request Φ7 e:pay client
8 make payment Φ8 client e:pay
9 contact bank Φ9 e:pay e:bank
10 make payment Φ10 e:bank e:pay
11 send invoices Φ11 e:pay client
12 inform of the payment Φ12 e:pay e:win
13 inform of the payment Φi13 e:win e:provi (i=1,2)
14 ship product Φi14 e:provi (i=1,2) client
the payment information, e:pay contacts e:bank to carry out the payment. Then
e:pay sends an invoice to client and informs e:win. Finally, e:win contacts the
selected provider to trigger the shipment of the product to client . Moreover, the
selected provider is not allowed to reveal their identity to an observer.
We also assume that no provider is discriminated against. Moreover, messages
communicated between the clouds X, W and Y are invisible, and other messages
are visible. However, the observer has no means of detecting their content (but
can observe the specific cloud from which a message originated or was sent to).
This can be captured by the following (static) observation function:
obs′(Φ1) = a obs′(Φ12) =  obs
′(Φ22) = 
obs′(Φ13) =  obs
′(Φ23) =  obs
′(Φ4) = b
obs′(Φ5) = a obs′(Φ6) =  obs′(Φ7) = c
obs′(Φ8) = d obs′(Φ9) =  obs′(Φ10) = 
obs′(Φ11) = c obs′(Φ12) =  obs′(Φ113) = 
obs′(Φ213) =  obs
′(Φ114) = e obs
′(Φ214) = e
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Using opacity, we may show that visible interaction do not reveal the identity
of the provider supplying the goods. To see this, we consider a property γ con-
sisting of all execution scenarios where the first provider supplied the goods, i.e.,
executions of the following form:
ξ1 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ2 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ3 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ4 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
The set of observations they generate is given by obs(γ) = {abacdce}. We then
note that γ¯ comprises, among others, executions of the following kind:
ξ1 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ2 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ3 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ4 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
Hence obs(γ) ⊆ obs(γ¯), and so γ is an opaque property. As a result, it is never
possible to say for sure that it was the first provider who supplied the goods.
Since the argument is completely symmetric, we can conclude that the identity
of providers is kept secret.
3.5 Probabilistic Behaviour of Opacity in Cloud
Computing Systems
An observation cannot establish a predicate, if for any run of the system in which
the predicate is true, there is a run for which the predicate is false, and the
two runs are observationally equivalent under the defined observation function.
However, in the case where the probability of the first run is significantly higher
than the probability of the second, the observer may have good reasons to believe
that the predicate is none the less true.
Consider that a malicious service provider (insider) can observe any specific
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users’ behaviours and interactions with the server by studying the patterns of
users behaviours in the cloud system, and then the malicious insider can deduce
information about the users, which might cause confidential information leak.
Here, we consider the probabilistic opacity in the cloud computing systems which
allows us to reason the quantitative properties of the systems.
All the resources, the computation technology and the software required are
located in the server system refereed to as the environment. Users request
data/service and required processing software from computing system through
a device with internet connection. After all the data processing is done at the
computing system, the result is sent back to the client. For the purpose of mea-
suring the opacity of the system, we consider the probability distributions on
random variables of user behaviour traces.
We generally use the language of random variable rather than talk directly
about distributions. Here, D is a finite set with a discrete probability distribu-
tion. A discrete random variable X is a surjective function which maps events to
values of a countable set (e.g., the integers), with each value in the range having
probability greater than zero, and R is the finite range of X, i.e. X : D → R(D).
For each d ∈ D, we write p(d) for its probability, then we have:
0 < p(d) ≤ 1, and
∑
d∈D
p(d) = 1
The system can be considered as a communication channel, discrete random
variable X is constructed to model a finite set of possible traces performed by the
end users during their interactions with the system. Each trace is a finite sequence
of actions performed by the user, i.e., ξ = Φ1 . . .Φn, (n ∈ N), which express how
the user reaches the finial action Φn from the initial action Φ1 during requesting
a specific service. In addition, each trace is associated with a positive probability,
and the sum of the probabilities of all possible traces is 1. In order to consider
probabilistic behaviours and quantitative analysis of opacity in the system, we
consider that for all traces in the system:
n∑
i=1
p(ξi) = 1
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In this study, we require the traces of system should be finite, thus, n ∈ N
denotes the number of the finite traces of the system.
Following the definitions of observation function in Section 3.4. Therefore,
the observed traces form a distribution:
m∑
i=1
p(obs(ξi)) = 1
where m ∈ N denotes the number of the finite observable traces.
The computing system is modelled as a tuple which includes: a set of users
interacting with the system; a set of actions and observables during the inter-
actions between the users and the system; a set of actual traces to model the
sequences of actions performed by the users during interacting with the system; a
set of observed traces to model the observations upon the actual traces; random
variables built on both of the actual traces and the observed traces. It assumes
that the random variables on the traces are obtained by repeated experiments.
Definition 24. Service-based computing system is a tuple:
(U,A, Obs,T,O, µT, µO)
- U is a finite set of users ;
- A is a finite set of actions modelling the interactions between a server and
the users.
- Obs is a finite set of observables ;
- T is a set of actual traces, i.e., possible sequences of actions of all the users;
- O is a finite set of observed traces obtained from the actual traces;
- µT represents a family of probability distributions, each of which is on all
actual traces of each client interacting with the server.
For any specific user u ∈ U, let all possible traces of a user u requesting a
service s located in the system be denoted by: Tu,s = {ξi | 1 ≤ i ≤ nu,s},
where Tu,s ⊆ T. The probability distribution: Pu,s : Tu,s → [0, 1], and
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∀u ∈ U, ∑nu,si=1 p(ξi) = 1, where Pu,s ∈ µT, and Tu,s denotes the random
variable of Tu,s under the condition of user u requesting the service s;
- µO denotes a family of probability distributions, each of which is on all
observed traces obtained from the actual traces.
3.5.1 Threat Model
Information lattice is proposed for the entities in the cloud computing system
in Section 3.1. In this part, we assume that there are two types of actions:
hidden actions and observable actions, which related to high security level and low
security level respectively. Actions labelled hidden are confidential and hidden
to the adversaries, and actions labelled observable are public and observable
to the adversaries. The classification can be based on the security preserving
mechanisms or policies applied in the computing system. Therefore, the actions
can be described as the union of two disjoint sets:
A = high unionmulti low
For each trace, some part of it is hidden and some part of it is observable,
which makes some traces equivalent to the others when only considering observ-
able actions. Therefore, adversaries can derive some confidential information by
building sets of equivalence classes from the observations.
3.5.2 Actual Traces and Observations
We now look at the properties of observations on the behaviours of users within
the computing system through equivalence relations. Consider that an end user
logs into a service provider of the system, and performs a sequence of actions
denoted by (Φj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, n ∈ N,Φj ∈ A). The finite sequence of actions of
a user forms a trace which starts from the user login in and terminates at the
user login out. The service-based computing works on a client-server basis and
provides server-based applications and all data services to the user.
We consider that the possible actual traces of each end user are viewed as a
random variable and follow a probability distribution, each trace is a sequence of
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Figure 3.6: An example for observations on actual traces
actions, i.e., ξi = (Φj | Φj ∈ A), and ξi ∈ T. Let the probability of a trace ξi be
p(ξi) = pi, and
∑m
i=1 pi = 1. Let Φ1 denotes login in the system, and Φn denotes
login out. The observable traces can be viewed as projections of the actual traces.
Example 6. Consider Figure 3.6 as an example. User u1 performs four
possible actual traces {ξi | i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}. Assuming the probability of trace ξi
is p(ξi) = pi, we have:
• ξ1: (Φ1Φ2Φ3Φ4)→ p1
• ξ2: (Φ1Φ2Φ4Φ5)→ p2
• ξ3: (Φ2Φ3Φ6)→ p3
• ξ4: (Φ2Φ3Φ5Φ6)→ p4
Moreover,
∑4
i=1 pi = 1. The actual traces are obfuscated due to the applied
security policy of the system which produces observable traces. Assuming that
underlined Φ3,Φ5 actions are labelled as high security, we obtain the following
observations from the attackers’ point of view:
• δ1 : (Φ1Φ2Φ4)→ p(δ1) • δ2 : (Φ2Φ6)→ p(δ2)
and O = {δ1, δ2}, i.e., the observation functions can be summarised as:
• obs(ξ1) = obs(ξ2) = δ1 • obs(ξ3) = obs(ξ4) = δ2
The probability of observation δ1 is p(δ1) = p1 + p2, and the probability of
observation δ2 is p(δ2) = p3 + p4. The adversary therefore builds equivalence
relations on the inverse images of the observations and derives information from
the observations on users behaviours in the system.
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Definition 25. Equivalence classes In mathematics, when a set has an equiv-
alence relation defined on its elements, there is a natural grouping of elements
that are related to one another, forming what are called equivalence classes.
In this example, the equivalence classes are based on the security type of
actions of traces. Intuitively, we consider the observation as the sum of the pro-
jection on the actual traces. Information on the users’ behaviours from the traces
can be partially deduced from these observations. Under repeated observation
on traces, we can deduce the probability distribution for the projections of the
possible traces for end users.
3.6 Quantitative Analysis of Opacity in Cloud
Computing Systems
In this section, quantitative analysis of opacity in the cloud computing systems
will be introduced.
3.6.1 Observational Equivalence: pi-opacity
If ξ1 and ξ2 are two actual traces, such that the observations of them are equal,
i.e., obs(ξ1) = obs(ξ2), we write ξ1 w ξ2 and say that they are observationally
equivalent. Different security policy might produce different observations for the
same actual traces of the end user. For all possible actual traces, if observations
on them are the same, then the observer can not tell any difference of the user’s
actual behaviours, and the system is completely secure under its security policy.
We can say predicate γ is pi-opaque w.r.t. obs if the probability of hav-
ing a run in a predicate γ which is not covered by a run in γ¯ is zero, i.e.,
p(γ\obs−1(obs(γ¯))) = 0.
Example 7. Consider that a user u requests a service s, and assume that the
actual traces are Tu,s = {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4}, where:
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• ξ1 = (Φ1Φ2Φ3Φ4Φ5)→ 14
• ξ2 = (Φ1Φ3Φ4Φ5)→ 12
• ξ3 = (Φ1Φ2Φ3Φ5)→ 18
• ξ4 = (Φ1Φ3Φ5)→ 18
We have:
obs(ξ1) = obs(ξ2) = obs(ξ3) = obs(ξ4) = (Φ1Φ3Φ5)→ 1
i.e., ξ1 w ξ2 w ξ3 w ξ4. The above implies that the traces are observantly
equivalent to each other and we say that γ is pi-opaque.
3.6.2 Proportion-based Opacity Measurement: piχp-opacity
The observational equivalence is too strict in practice. One might require only
that the probability of the non-equivalent traces is low. To capture this, we
first define the opacity quantity as the proportion of the equivalent traces over
the whole actual traces. The higher such quantity is, the more secure the system
becomes. This also meets our intuition: lower probability of non-equivalent traces
means that it is harder for the observers to tell the differences in users’ behaviours.
Definition 26. Proportion-based opacity quantity is the probability of the
set of the equivalent traces:
χp = p({ ξ ∈ T|∀ξ′ ∈ T\{ξ} : obs(ξ) 6= obs(ξ′)})
The opacity is maximum when χp is 0, because the observer can not identify
the differences of observational traces. On the contrary, the opacity is minimum
when χp is 1. We say γ is piχp-opaque.
Example 8. Consider the actual traces of user u requesting service s are
Tu,s = {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4}, where:
• ξ1 = (Φ1Φ2Φ3Φ4Φ6)→ 18
• ξ2 = (Φ1Φ2Φ4)→ 14
• ξ3 = (Φ2Φ3Φ4Φ5)→ 18
• ξ4 = (Φ1Φ3Φ4Φ5)→ 12
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The actions Φ2,Φ3,Φ5 are non-observables. Therefore, the observation func-
tion gives:
• obs(ξ1) = (Φ1Φ4Φ6)→ 18
• obs(ξ2) = obs(ξ4) = (Φ1Φ4)→ 34
• obs(ξ3) = (Φ4)→ 18
Hence ξ2 and ξ4 are equivalent traces. Therefore, the proportion-based opacity
measurement is as follows:
χp = p(ξ1) + p(ξ3) =
1
8
+
1
8
= 0.25
therefore, γ is pi0.25-opacity.
3.6.3 Entropy-based Opacity Measurement: p¯iI-opacity
The measurement we consider here is based on the likelihood of a particular trace
of actions being performed by the end user, i.e., on the probability distribution on
the user’s behaviours to measure the observations. Shannon’s measures are based
on a logarithmic measure of the surprise, inherent in a probabilistic event. There-
fore, it is natural to consider Shannon’s entropy as the basis of the information
loss measurement.
We consider possible traces of an end user interacting with a service provider
in the system as random variables, and define the quantity of observations of the
computing system by using the concept of mutual information between the actual
traces and observations.
Definition 27. Consider any specific user u ∈ U requesting service s. The
quantity of entropy-based information (uncertainty) loss due to user u in the
computing system (U,A, Obs,T,O, µT, µO) is defined as:
I(Tu,s;Ou,s) = H(Tu,s)−H(Tu,s|Ou,s)
where Tu,s and Ou,s denotes the random variables for the user u’s actual traces
Tu,s and observations traces Ou,s respectively; H(Tu,s) is the entropy (uncertainty
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measurement) of traces in Tu,s, and H(Tu,s|Ou,s) is the conditional entropy of
Tu,s, given the observation Ou,s (the remaining uncertainty Tu,s after observing
Ou,s). Here, we say γ is p¯iI-opacity.
Example 9. Consider the example discussed in Figure 3.6. Assume p(ξi) =
1
4
,
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Therefore,
obs = {δ1, δ2} & p(δ1) = 1
2
& p(δ2) =
1
2
The observations is then computed as follows:
I(ξ1; δ1) = H(ξ1)−H(ξ1|δ1) = 4 ∗ 1
4
log2 4− (2 ∗
1
2
log2 2) = 1
The mutual information between ξ1 and δ1 is 1, therefore, the information
observation is 0, i.e., all the observation traces are equal to each other under that
applied security preserving policy, and we say γ is p¯i0-opacity.
The above discussion focuses on the case of one user. The following definition
defines the security measurement for all users in the computing system. It is
based on the mean value of the security measurements of all users’ behaviours,
each of which is calculated by using Definition 27.
Definition 28. The quantity of the information loss of a computing system is
defined as the mean value of all users’ information loss:
χe =
m∑
i=1
pi · I(Ti;Oi)
where m is the number of end users, pi denotes the probability of all possible
traces of user ui requesting a service s, Ti and Oi denote the random variables
of actual traces and observed traces under condition of user ui defined by µT and
µO, I(Ti;Oi) denotes the information loss of user ui.
45
3.6.4 Channel Capacity: pˆiC-opacity
The opacity measurement in previous section is calculated with respect to the
average of each user’s observation measurement. For some cases, we might need
to provide the maximum one among all users’ information loss. We next define
another measurement based on the concept of channel capacity.
Let us consider the security preserving mechanisms of the system providing
secure communication channels for clients and services in the information theoret-
ical sense. A channel consists of a set of inputs (actual traces T), a set of outputs
(observed traces O), and a set of images between them (F : T → O), where T
and O denotes the random variables of T and O. Intuitively, actual behaviours of
the users can be partially derived by the observers through the observed traces.
The maximum mutual information between T and O over all possible users
u ∈ U regarding to requesting a service s is considered as the channel’s capacity.
Definition 29. The channel capacity of computing system is defined as:
C = maxu∈UI(Tu,s;Ou,s)
when all the user u request a service s. We say γ is pˆiC-opacity.
Example 10. Let us consider a simple example: an on-line paper assessing
management system called iWorks. The system iWorks allows the users to browse
papers, contribute reviews, and discussion through the Web. We assume the
follows:
• The possible actions are: A = {Φi|1 ≤ i ≤ 10} that include: logging in
(Φ1), downloading papers (Φ2), uploading papers (Φ3), reviewing papers
(Φ4), commenting papers (Φ5), deleting papers (Φ6), ranking papers (Φ7),
edit personal information (Φ8), sending private comments to authors (Φ9),
logging out (Φ10);
• Actions Φ1 to Φ6 and Φ10 are observable behaviours, and actions Φ7, Φ8,
Φ9 are hidden behaviours according to the security policy applied by the
system: Obs = {Φ1,Φ6,Φ10};
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• There are two users: U = {u1, u2};
• The iWorks service requested by the users is denoted by s;
• The sum of the probability of all traces performed by all the users is 1. The
probability of all possible traces of user u1 is
2
3
, and that of user u2 is
1
3
;
• The possible actual traces of each user and conditional probabilities of each
user’s traces are as follows:
user actual traces cond. prob. under ui
2
3
.u1 ξ11 : Φ1 Φ2 Φ4 Φ5 Φ7 Φ9 Φ10
1
4
ξ12 : Φ1 Φ3 Φ8 Φ10
1
6
ξ13 : Φ1 Φ8 Φ2 Φ9 Φ4 Φ5 Φ7 Φ10
1
6
ξ14 : Φ1 Φ9 Φ2 Φ4 Φ5 Φ7 Φ10
1
6
ξ15 : Φ1 Φ9 Φ3 Φ4 Φ7 Φ10
1
8
ξ16 : Φ1 Φ8 Φ3 Φ4 Φ10
1
8
1
3
.u2 ξ21 : Φ1 Φ2 Φ6 Φ8 Φ10
1
2
ξ22 : Φ1 Φ2 Φ6 Φ7 Φ9 Φ10
1
4
ξ23 : Φ1 Φ2 Φ8 Φ9 Φ6 Φ10
1
4
The actions with underline are hidden by the security mechanisms applied
by the system. The observations are therefore presented as follows:
user actual traces cond. prob. under ui
2
3
.u1 obs(ξ11) : Φ1 Φ2 Φ4 Φ5 Φ10
7
12
obs(ξ12) : Φ1 Φ3 Φ10
1
6
obs(ξ13) : Φ1 Φ3 Φ4 Φ10
1
4
1
3
.u2 obs(ξ21) : Φ1 Φ2 Φ6 Φ10
3
4
obs(ξ22) : Φ1 Φ2 Φ6 Φ10
1
4
The entropy-based information loss due to the behaviour of user u1 is:
I(T1;O1) = H(
7
12
,
1
4
,
1
6
) = 1.38
The entropy-based information loss due to the behaviour of user u2 is:
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I(T2;O2) = H(
3
4
,
1
4
) = 0.81
The overall information loss (i.e., all users’ information loss) of the system is:
χe = 1.38 ∗ 2
3
+ 0.81 ∗ 1
3
= 1.19
The channel capacity of the system is:
C = maxu∈UI(Tu,s;Ou,s) = 1.38
In the above, Ti and Oi denote the random variables of actual traces and
observed traces of user ui (i ∈ {1, 2}) respectively. Therefore, the γ is pˆi1.38-
opacity.
Note that different security preserving mechanisms or policies might produce
different observations. Given a computing system, it is necessary to study the
relations among the security policies applied by the system, from the point view of
the security degrees produced. Theorem 2 suggests an ordering on such relations.
Theorem 2. Let P1, P2 be two security preserving policies, and η1, η2 be two
equivalence classes due to P1, P2 respectively. We use T to denote the random
variable of actual trace, O1, O2 to denote the relevant random variables of observed
traces under η1, η2 . Then we have:
η1 ⊆ η2 ⇒ I(T ;O1) ≥ I(T ;O2)
Intuitively, the above implies that if η2 is coarser than η1 then the information
loss under η2 is less than the case under η1.
Proof : η1 ⊆ η2 implies η2 is coarser than or equal to η1, from a view of
partition by building the equivalence class on the actual traces T, i.e., η1∩η2 = η1.
Therefore, the uncertainty measure of the random variable of actual trace T
given condition O2 is bigger than or equal to that of T given condition O1, i.e.,
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H(T |O2) ≥ H(T |O1), and therefore:
I(T ;O1)− I(T ;O2)
= (H(T )−H(T |O1))− (H(T )−H(T |O2))
= H(T |O2)−H(T |O1) ≥ 0
We obtain: η1 ⊆ η2 ⇒ I(T ;O1) ≥ I(T ;O2).
3.6.5 Distance-based Opacity Measurement: p˜iχdKL-opacity,
p¨iχdJS -opacity
The above notions may not distinguish differences between different end users.
In this part, we introduce a notion of private measurement which can capture
the subtle differences between the observed traces of different users. Intuitively,
a possible way to assess such differences could be, e.g., to look at the probability
distributions induced by the random variable of the observable traces of two
different users, and analyse how similar they are. In our last attempt at a notion
of privacy loss measurement, we define χd which uses distributed divergence as a
way to measure the differences between the distribution of observed traces of any
two different end users. We consider two divergence here: the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence and the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence [26].
The KL divergence is a non-symmetric measure of the difference between
two probability distributions O1 and O2, which represent the distribution of the
observed traces for two users. Note that, the more the similarity of O1 and
O2, the smaller the distance between O1 and O2, the less privacy information is
released regarding to the distance based measurement. The KL-based privacy
loss measurement is defined as follows:
Definition 30. Consider any specific user u ∈ U requesting service s. The
quantity of KL-based security measurement due to user u in the computing system
(U,A, Obs,T,O, µT, µO) is defined as the inverse of the KL-distance between the
random variables for actual traces and observations:
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χdKL(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) =
1
DKL(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) =
1∑n
i=1 T (i) log2
T (i)
O(i)
where Tu,s and Ou,s denote the random variables for the user u’s actual traces
Tu,s and observations Ou,s respectively, DKL denotes the KL-distance, n ∈ N
denotes the size of the actual traces, T (i) denotes the probability distribution of
the actual trace, O(i) denotes the probability distribution of the observations. We
call γ is p˜iLdKL -opacity.
Intuitively, such measurement captures the average of the logarithmic differ-
ence between the probabilities T and O, where the average is taken using the
probabilities T . Note that the KL-distance is always non-negative, and therefore
the KL-based measurement is non-negative as well. In addition, the bigger the
distance between the actual traces and observations, the less the information is
released to the observers which also meets our intuition.
Note that the KL divergence is not symmetric: the KL from T to O is gen-
erally not the same as the KL from O to T . One can consider the symmetrised
divergence JS-distance as the metric, which is defined as follows:
Definition 31. Consider any two users u ∈ U requesting service s. The quan-
tity of JS-based security measurement for privacy due to user u1 and u2 in the
computing system (U,A, Obs,T,O, µT, µO) is defined as:
χdJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s)
= H(Tu,s)· [1−DJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s)]
= H(Tu,s)· [1− 1
2
(DKL(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) +DKL(Ou,s ‖ Tu,s))]
where Tu,s and Ou,s denotes the random variables for user u’s actual traces
Tu,s and observation Ou,s respectively, DJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) denotes the JS-distance
between Tu,s and Ou,s, and H(Tu,s) denotes the entropy for distribution Tu,s. We
call γ is p¨iχdJS -opacity.
The JS-based measurement can be interpreted as the capacity of the informa-
tion channel with two inputs giving the output distributions T and O. Note that
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the JS-distance DJS is always bounded by [0, 1], the JS-based leakage measure-
ment is therefore always bounded by [0,H(Tu,s)]. Furthermore, this meets our
intuition:
• the χdJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) is minimum (0) when the distance DJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) is
maximum (1);
• the χdJS(Tu,s ‖ Ou,s) is maximum (H(Tu,s)), i.e., the total information en-
tropy of the random variable of actual traces when the distance DJS(Tu,s ‖
Ou,s) is minimum (0).
Similar to definition 28, we can calculate the total quantity of information
loss of a computing system by computing the mean value of all users information
loss:
χdKL =
m∑
i=1
pi·χKL(Ti ‖ Oi) or χdJS =
m∑
i=1
pi·χJS(Ti ‖ Oi)
depending on which divergence is applied, where m is the number of end users,
pi denotes the probability all possible traces of user ui requesting a service s, Ti
and Oi denote the random variables of actual traces and observed traces under
condition of user ui defined by µT and µO, χKL(Ti ‖ Oi) and χJS(Ti ‖ Oi) denotes
the distance-based information loss measure of user ui.
3.7 An Application to Service Partitioning
In this part, a simple application of the quantitative analysis of opacity approach
to service partitioning in a hybrid computing system is given. The entropy-based
measurement and channel capacity computation can be used to help protecting
clients’ data in the hybrid computing environment. Specifically, given a type of
observers of interest, based on the measurement achieved, services/data can be
allocated into systems with different security level as required.
The entropy-based opacity measurement implies the degree of transparency
of the communication channel between the clients and the services in the system
under different security preserving mechanisms to the observers. For instance,
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Figure 3.7: Application to service partitioning for hybrid system
we can move services which connect to lower capacity channels to public system,
and move services which connect to higher capacity channels to private system.
In particular, given a threshold τ , let the channel capacity regarding to a service
Si be Ci. If Ci < τ , one can move service Si to the public system; otherwise, one
can move service Si to private system.
For instance, Figure 3.7 shows the intuition of the basic idea discussed above.
Assume we have a set of clients who are interacting with the service providers
(S1, S2, S3) located in the system. By applying the measurement mechanism, we
get the capacity of channels to service S1, S2, S3 denoted by C1, C2, C3. Assume
C1 < τ , C2 < τ , and C3 ≥ τ , where τ is a given threshold. According to the basic
rules, we can move S1, S2 to public site and S3 to private site.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, security lattice is introduced for cloud computing systems, and
a formal model to provide flow-sensitive analysis of federated cloud computing
system is presented. The entities located in the cloud computing systems are
represented as a lattice. Opacity is introduced for cloud computing systems.
A service-based computing system is defined based on the behaviour of users.
Probabilistic and information theoretic means and equivalence relation are used
to quantify the opacity in the system. This study can help service providers
allocate services or resources into federated computing system.
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Chapter 4
Cost-benefit Analysis of
Enterprise Information Security
Technology
Many organizations maintain sensitive information or documents that should be
accessed only by authorized personnel, for example, personal health records in
health institutions, bank statements and account balances for financial organiza-
tions. Confidential information leakage and sensitive information distortion have
been identified as one of the major information security threats that cause rep-
utation damage, identity theft and even threaten the viability of the company
[27]. It is essential that companies and organizations keep these information and
documents safe. Enterprise information security technologies (e.g., usb, DRM)
are developed to address these concerns, use encryption to restrict the access of
protected document to authorized end users.
The investment into an enterprise information security product involves mas-
sive uncertainty. Therefore, one major hurdle for implementing these products
maybe that organization, as potential users, do not have an established proce-
dure to evaluate the benefit, effectiveness, impact and cost of these products
quantitatively.
Information security research has been traditionally focused on the technology
and products themselves, for example, the architectures of the system, access
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control, the functionality of the products. The impact of these products on
business process and the impact of human behaviour on the effectiveness of the
system have not been documented to date, although human behaviour has been
identified as one of the critical factors that determine the effectiveness of security
measures [1; 2].
The primary objective of this study is, therefore, to propose a standard proce-
dure for organizations to conduct cost-benefit analyses for enterprise information
security products using stochastic models. This procedure applies the concept
of security metrics and Petri nets stochastic modelling to simulate the business
process and human behaviour involved in enterprise information security tech-
nology. Potential cost and benefit of deploying enterprise information security
products can be evaluated in quantitative terms. Using this procedure, not only
different information security products can be compared in the same term, enter-
prise information security projects can also be compared with other projects in
the organizations’ portfolio in monetary terms. This information provides basis
for organizations to make sound investment decisions.
4.1 Quantitative Evaluation Procedure (QEP)
The proposed evaluation procedure will focus on the following three aspects: the
value or benefit that enterprise information security products can bring to the
organization; the effectiveness of the products and factors that will impact the
effectiveness; and finally, the cost and impact that information security products
have on organizations.
In this procedure, information is treated as a business asset with varying levels
of commercial values as introduced by Huebner and Britt [28] and Humphreys
[29]. Since it is usually difficult to measure the benefits of information secu-
rity products directly, costs of document disclosure or modification is measured
instead to quantify the benefits as suggested by [30].
In addition, human behaviour is an integral part in the proposed procedure.
Stochastic Petri nets models are used to simulate the behaviour and interactions
of people who are involved in organizational functions. Human behaviour has
been identified as one of the critical factors that determine the effectiveness of
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Figure 4.1: The flow chart of the proposed quantitative evaluation procedure (QEP)
for enterprise information security products.
security measures [1; 2; 31]. For example, information security mechanism will
not be effective, if an individual employee does not comply with it or is not aware
of it [2]. Company policies, e.g. the way documents/information are classified,
affect the effectiveness of the information products as well.
Finally, in the proposed procedure, a method of quantitatively evaluating cost
and impact of the information security products in monetary terms is proposed.
Some costs associated with these products are tangible, for example, the capital
expenditures on the products and associated hardware/software and daily oper-
ational expenditures associated with maintenance. These tangible costs are easy
to account for in monetary terms. There are also some intangible costs. For
example, it has been documented that implementing a strict security mechanism
will reduce the efficiency of the organization [2; 32]. The requirement of security
behaviour often has conflicts, and competes for working hours with employee’s
production tasks [2]. In addition, encryption - a major information security func-
tion often reduces the availability of data and brings inconvenience to end users
to use protected documents [32]. The impact of information security products on
staff productivity is quantified in terms of non-productive time (NPT).
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The proposed procedure for the quantitative evaluation of enterprise informa-
tion security products is summarized in Figure 4.1 and described step by step
below:
Step 1: Understand the working mechanism of the enterprise information
security product in evaluation, by testing the products and by reading manuals or
white papers provided by the product provider. Plot flow charts that represent the
communications among users, servers, and administrators. These flow charts are
the prototype of the business process. General information on the architecture,
major components and major functionalities of the system can be available in
previous publications.
Step 2: Evaluate and classify the organization’s digital information assets.
Study the organization’s document classification policies, and classify the doc-
uments/information into different categories by their level of confidentiality ac-
cording to company policies. Then assign estimated values to documents of each
category. This information valuation process should be based on the business
needs of the organization [29]. These values will be used in Steps 4 and 7 of the
proposed procedure. Methods and processes to evaluate the value of documents
can be found in published works, (e.g.,[29; 33; 34; 35]).
Step 3: Gather information about the organization and statistics on the hu-
man behaviour of staff members in the organization. These statistics include but
not limited to: the total number of employees in the organization, the time that
a user has to wait to receive assistance from an administrator etc. It has been
reported that most security incidents are caused by human errors instead of tech-
nology failures [36], although security incidents can result from natural disasters,
technical issues and human acts [37]. Human acts can be further classified into
two categories: malicious or non-malicious. Malicious acts often include different
types of human malicious acts [2]. Non-malicious acts are usually caused by users
who did not understand or ignored security policies. Typical violations include
sharing of passwords and not closing documents after viewing them, and so on
[37].
Three main techniques have been established and widely used to collect and
analyse human behaviour data: questionnaires, interviews, and action research.
A questionnaire consists of a series of questions; respondents answer questions by
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completing the questionnaire themselves [38]. An interview is a conversation be-
tween the interviewer and the interviewee, in which interviewer elicit information
from the interviewee [38]. Action research is a reflective process of progressive
problem solving. Researcher themselves are actively involved in the topic be-
ing researched. They work with each other to improve the current situation [39].
Baskerville [40] and Baskerville and Wood-Harper [41] introduced action research
methods into information systems research. Stephanou [42] successfully applied
the action research method to evaluate the impact of information security aware-
ness training on users’ information security behaviour.
Human behaviour data are critical inputs into the stochastic Petri nets model
in Step 6. It might take significant time and effort to gather this information.
However, the better the quality of the statistics on user behaviour, the more
accurate the results of the evaluation of the informations security products will
be. In general, if the model is more complex, more data are needed.
Step 4: Build a business process that includes a set of ordered activities to
be undertaken by humans or other resources of the organization. This business
process is a set of logically related tasks performed to achieve a defined business
goal [31]. It is a structure for actions and implies on how work is done within
an organization. These actions are work activities across time and space, with a
beginning and an ending [43]. Users in the organization use documents to do their
daily work. Document/information classification policies and human behaviour
shapes the business process in the organization. Main business process modelling
techniques can be found in various published research documents. (e.g., [44]).
Step 5: Define security metrics. Security metrics are a series of criteria
that are defined to help organization measure the success of security investments;
security metrics enable organization to know how well the security products or
security strategies are meeting the security objectives. Most security metrics
cover these four different aspects: perimeter defense capability, coverage and
control, availability and reliability, application risks [45]. The value of each item
in the metrics will be generated by the stochastic model in Step 6. For example,
the number of documents protected by the digital rights management (DRM)
product is a measure of DRM product perimeter defense capability; the number
of workstations covered by the DRM product is measure of the coverage of control
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of DRM product; the amount/percentage of documents that cannot be accessed
by authorized users is a measure of the availability and reliability of the DRM
product. The number of users who share password to open protected document
is measure of the application risks of the DRM product. Information on choosing
and defining security metrics can be found in previous publications (e.g., [45; 46]).
Step 6 : Construct and run the stochastic Petri nets model. In this step,
the business process established in Step 4 is mapped into Petri nets application
software. After the business process is mapped, parameters collected and defined
in Step 3 are input into the model. Model outputs are used to calculate the
security metrics that are defined in Step 5.
Step 7 : Account for all the tangible and intangible costs of the enterprise
information security products and calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of
the implementation project using the results from Step 6. The calculated NPV
is then used to help information security manager to make security investment
decisions. Further information on NPV and economic model can be found in
previous publications (e.g., [30; 47]).
4.2 Case Study
Digital Right Management (DRM) is one of many information security products,
and DRM claims to have the ability to protect the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information in the organization [48; 49; 50; 51]. In this section, MS
IRM (Microsoft Information Rights Management) is studied in order to illustrate
the procedure proposed. MS IRM is a DRM product developed by Microsoft
Corporation. It is a Microsoft Office component, and can be implemented through
the Rights Management Services installed on Windows Server 2003 or 2008.
4.2.1 MS IRM System Analysis
According to the proposed procedure, the first step is to understand the working
mechanism of the DRM by reading the DRM user manual and by testing using
the software.
One key feature of the MS IRM is that it centrally manages documents and
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Figure 4.2: A simple representation of the working mechanism of MS IRM product.
This chart illustrates the relationship between the MS IRM server, administrators, and
users.
uses encryption to keep the information secure no matter where it has been trans-
ferred. Authorized users use decryption keys to open the document and access the
information [52; 53]. Administrators who have unlimited access to this central-
ized space play a key role in the IRM business process. Administrators manage
protected documents by defining and changing policies for all the documents and
authorized users regardless of the document location. Administrators create new
authorized users or delete existing authorized users from the user list of the doc-
ument [52; 53]. The workflow of creating and viewing a protected document by
authorized users is illustrated in Figure 4.2. When a user tries to open a protected
document (process 7), the centralized server will check the authentication of the
user. If the authentication fails, the user has to seek help from the administrator.
The administrator will then check the identity of the user to make sure that the
user has the status to access the document and add this user to the authorized
user list of the particular document (processes 4 and 5).
The working mechanism in an MS IRM environment is described below:
1. An administrator uses an IRM-enabled application to create a normal doc-
ument. When the administrator chooses the restrict permission option, the
IRM controller is triggered. The IRM controller immediately requests a
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username and a password from the administrator. When the administra-
tor’s response is sent to the server, the server validates the client. If the
information is validated, the administrator can define users and users’ rights
for this document.
2. The IRM controller encrypts the document with a random symmetric key,
and then sends a request for a publishing license directly to the IRM server.
The request includes the random symmetric key, usage policies assigned to
the encrypted document.
3. The IRM server encrypts the symmetric key with the server public key.
Then the IRM server generates a publishing license, which includes the
encrypted symmetric key, rights policy assigned to the encrypted document
and the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the IRM server. IRM server
then encrypts the publishing license with public key. Users and documents,
rights and private key are kept in the IRM server.
4. The server returns the publishing license to the administrator side, and
binds the publishing license to the encrypted document file.
5. Administrator distributes the document.
6. When a user tries to open a MS IRM protected document, the IRM con-
troller is triggered on the user side, which requests the username and pass-
word information from this user.
7. The IRM controller sends a license request to IRM server. The license
request includes the user’s Rights Management user Account certificate
(RAC), content identity, public key, the publishing license, and the rights
policy information.
8. The license generator on the server checks whether or not the user is au-
thorized (the user’s identity is present in the user identities repository).
If the user’s identity does not match the present identity in the identities
repository, the server rejects creating license. After the license generator
confirms all the information, the license generator decrypts the symmetric
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key using the private key of the server, re-encrypts it using the public key
of the user, and creates user license (which contains the symmetric key for
decrypting the document and the rights information) for the user.
9. User license is sent back to client side, the IRM controller uses license to
decrypt and open the encrypted document.
4.2.2 Document Classification and Value
Sensitive documents can be classified into many levels according to their confi-
dentiality and the impact in the event their confidentiality is compromised [29].
In this case study, sensitive documents in the organization are divided into two
levels: confidential and strictly confidential documents. Users only need a user-
name and password to open confidential documents; on the contrary, users need
to have the particular password of each strictly confidential document in addition
to user’s own username and password. In this case study, it is assumed that there
are 4000 sensitive documents in the organization that need to be protected by
MS IRM. 50% of sensitive documents in the organization are classified as strictly
confidential documents.
One reason for document classification is practicality. It is often time-consuming
and cost prohibitive to assign a value to each single document that needs to be
protected. Once the document is classified, however, a single value can be as-
signed to a particular class. In this case study, the financial value of a confidential
document is assigned to be £10, 000 and the value of a strictly confidential docu-
ment is assigned to be £25, 000 in confidentiality terms to the organization [29].
4.2.3 User Behaviour Study
In this study, a set of assumptions about user behaviours are made (Table 4.1),
which can be used to show the methodology we proposed. In a real business case,
user behaviour data should be collected instead of assumed. In the next chapter,
we will provide more information about the parameters.
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Table 4.1: Data on human behaviour within the organization. Human behaviour is an
important factor in the effectiveness of DRM products. User behaviour data are critical
input parameters of the stochastic Petri nets model. In general, they are gathered using
questionnaire, interview, or action research methods.
Parameters Value
Number of documents, an user might use every day on average 4
Number of normal working hours per day 8
Number of working weeks per year 40
Number of administrators in the organization 2
The percentage of working time, unauthorized users get oppor-
tunities to read documents
0.025%
The percentage of time when authorized users experience a login
system failure
1%
The percentage of time, users cannot remember the password for
strictly confidential documents
2%
Percentage of unauthorized users use username/password to lo-
gin in successfully
20%
Percentage of unauthorized users use document password to lo-
gin in successfully
20%
The average time users need to spend to pass user authentication 15 seconds
The average time users need to spend to pass document 15 seconds
authentication
The average time administrators need to help each user 10 minutes
The average time authorized users can wait for help 2 hours
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Figure 4.3: The flow chart illustrating business process of authorized user’s access
to documents under MS IRM protection. The chart is another and more detailed
representation of the relationship between the MS IRM server, administrators and users.
Authorized users need to pass authentication in order to access protected documents.
In case they cannot pass authentication, they need help from administrators to gain
access.
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4.2.4 Business Process of MS IRM
One key step in the proposed procedure is to describe the business process asso-
ciated with the working mechanism of the DRM product. The business process
of using MS IRM system to protect confidential document is illustrated in a flow
chart that outlines the interactions between authorized users, system administra-
tors and the MS IRM system (Figure 4.3).
Potential users of a document can be classified into two groups, authorized
users and unauthorized users. For confidential document, MS IRM requires users
to log in using user’s log-in ID and password; for strictly confidential documents,
a document specific password is needed additionally. Authorized users should
possess correct passwords to open documents for which they have rights. However,
authorized users might forget the password, especially those of the document
specific passwords for strictly confidential documents, because they might not
open these documents frequently. In this case, the user will have to contact the
administrator to retrieve the password. Administrators, however, are not always
available, because they could be still handling previous requests. This will reduce
the efficiency of the organization and will result in non-productive time, NPT
[54].
For unauthorized users, since they are not supposed to possess the correct
password, the chance for them to open a confidential document is reduced; for
strict confidential document, the chance is even smaller (Figure 4.4). However,
there are still cases that unauthorized users can open protected documents. Unau-
thorized users might try a certain number of times and open the document suc-
cessfully; or they might have acquired the correct passwords because of security
leaks etc.
4.2.5 Security Metrics
Step 5 of the proposed procedure is to define security metrics in order to measure
the confidentiality and availability of documents. MS IRM uses encryption to
keep documents secure; this process decreases the availability of documents to
unauthorized users. As discussed previously, the value of the implementation of
MS IRM product is best measured by the cumulative value of all the confidential
64
Figure 4.4: The flow chart illustrating business process of unauthorized user’s access
to documents under MS IRM protection. In this case, if unauthorized users try to open
protected document, they will not receive assistance from the administrators when they
cannot pass authentication.
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Table 4.2: Security metrics defined to evaluate the effectiveness of the MS IRM
system. It is in general difficult to measure the benefit of DRM product. The potential
cost when document is leaked or compromised is usually defined instead. The number
of confidential and strictly confidential documents is therefore defined to evaluate the
benefit of the MS IRM products.
User’s Type Executive Document Type
1 unauthorized cannot read strictly confidential
2 unauthorized cannot read confidential
documents if they were disclosed to or modified by unauthorized users. The
metrics for MS IRM are defined in Table 4.2.
4.2.6 Stochastic Models Description and Results
Step 6 of the proposed procedure is to map the business into a stochastic Petri
net model and run this model. Data collected in Steps 2, 3 and 4 are input into
the Petri nets model. The value of security metrics defined in Step 5 and the
non-productive time will be generated by the simulation runs.
Figure 4.5 is a Petri nets model that was generated from the business process
model (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). The model consists of 14 places, 15 transitions (6
timed transitions and 9 immediate transitions), 3 input gates and 3 output gates.
The input gates and output gates control the enabling of activities and define the
making changes that will occur when activities complete.
Users of the documents in the organization (Users) can be grouped into two
categories, authorized and unauthorized users, therefore, the transaction Doc use
have two branches and can take the token to two places, Authorized User or
Unauthorized User, respectively.
For authorized users, the main model objective is to quantify the reduction
of working efficiency because of the changed workflow after installing MS IRM.
As discussed previously, the NPT associated with the implementation of DRM
products is one of the main negative impacts on the organizations. In this pro-
posed procedure, the NPT is modelled by timed transitions of stochastic Petri
nets. Two types of delays can be incurred by the implementation of MS IRM,
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Figure 4.5: A Petri nets model generated by mapping the business process associated
with both authorized users and unauthorized users into the Mo¨bius software. A Petri
nets model consists of places, transitions, and arcs that connect them. In this figure,
circles represent places, vertical lines represent transitions, lines represent arcs, and
triangles represent input gates and output gates.
the delay to pass authentication and the delay to wait for administrators’ help.
When authorized users try to open documents, whether the document is a
confidential document (Confi Doc) or strictly confidential document (Stri Doc),
the user needs to have a username and password in order to login to the system.
These authentication processes take a certain amount of time, and is accounted
as Login In 1. For strictly confidential document, the user further needs to in-
put in a document password (PassWord), which takes another certain amount
of time, given by the time taken by PW 1. If the user passes the document au-
thentication, then the user can open the document and become an active user
(Active User 1 ). However, if the user cannot pass the document authentication
or the user cannot pass the user authentication, the user will have to contact the
administrators (Need Help) for help. The time delay that the user has to wait for
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the administrators is accounted as Admin Help.
For unauthorized users, the main model objective is to quantify the reduction
in login-in success rate, after the organization implements the MS IRM system.
Unauthorized users will first have to log in to access any document, which is
represented by the transaction login In 3. This process is modeled as a token
starting in the place of Unauthorized User. If the login fails, the token will move
to the place, Login F. Then the transaction Failure will lead the token back to
the original place, Users. If the unauthorized user passed the first authentication
process of Log In 3, the token will move to the place, Login Success. Since there
are two types of documents defined in the organization, when the unauthorized
user tries to open a document, the transaction Doc Type, can lead the token into
two places, Stri Doc 2 (strictly confidential document) or Confi Doc 2 (regular
confidential document). If the token goes to the place of Confi Doc 2, the unau-
thorized user has access to the document. This is represented by the transaction
Successful that leads the token back to the original place, Users. If the token goes
to the place of Stri Doc 2, another authentication process will take place. This
is represented by the transaction, PW 2. PW 2 has two branches, successful and
unsuccessful, both of which lead the token back to the place Users.
Two security metrics are defined previously to measure the effectiveness of the
MS IRM system in Step 5 (Table 4.2), the number of times that unauthorized
users cannot read strictly confidential documents and confidential documents.
The values of security metrics are represented by throughput of transactions when
the model is run 96000 time units. The number of tokens that move through the
transition, PW 2 (case2) and Failure (case1), represents the number of strictly
confidential documents unauthorized users cannot read. The number of token
that moves through the transaction, Failure (case2), is the number of confidential
documents unauthorized users cannot read.
The behaviour of the model can be measured by the Impulse Rewards model
and Rate Rewards model in the Mo¨bius software [55]. The throughput of transi-
tions is computed according to the formula which is described in Section 2.3.2:∑
a∈A
CaN
a
[t,t+1]
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Figure 4.6: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of
MS IRM system. NPT increases significantly when the number of authorized users
served by each administrator increases. The total NPT is composed of two components:
the time loss associated with authentication process and the time loss associated with
waiting on administrators when authorized users fail to pass the authentication process.
The number of tokens in sets of places are computed according to the formula:∑
v∈P(P,N)
R(v)M
v
[t,t+1]
From the result of this study, the deployment of the DRM product has a
significant impact on the operational efficiency of the organization. Within one
year of the deployment of MS IRM in the network system in this case study (96000
time units in the model), a middle-sized organization that has 50 authorized users
will incur about 396 hours, or about 49.5 days, of non-productive time (Figure
4.6), under the assumptions made in Table 4.1. This total loss of productive
time has two components: the time spent on authentication procedures, around
255 hours and the time spent on waiting for responses from the administrators,
around 141 hours (Figure 4.6).
Under the assumption made in this study in Section 4.2.3 (Table 4.1), there
are 10 security attacks every year, in which unauthorized users attempt to read
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Figure 4.7: Total number of documents that unauthorized users cannot read associ-
ated with the deployment of MS IRM under the assumptions made in Table 4.1.
sensitive document. According to simulation results, as a result of MS IRM
deployment, around 5 strictly confidential documents are prevented from reading
by unauthorized users, and 4 confidential documents are prevented from reading
by unauthorized users (Figure 4.7).
4.2.7 Economic Models
In this section, the benefits and costs of implementing MS IRM products are
compared using the concept of NPV [37].
As discussed previously, the benefit of the MS IRM system is the reduction in
access of unauthorized users to confidential documents. In this case study, after
using the MS IRM system for one year, 5 strictly confidential documents are
prevented from reading by unauthorized users and 4 confidential documents are
prevented from reading by unauthorized users (Figure 4.7). Using the assumed
document value in Section 4.2.2, the annual benefits on documents disclosure
amounts to £165, 000 (Table 4.3).
The capital expenditure of implementing MS IRM system includes the pur-
chase of MS IRM system itself and any associated costs to upgrade hardware and
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Table 4.3: Benefits analysis of the MS IRM product. The benefit of the MS IRM
system includes a reduction in unauthorized access to confidential documents.
Annual benefits analysis on the confidentiality of documents by using MS IRM
Number of
documents
Single
document
value
Total
value
Strictly confidential documents that
are prevented from being read by unau-
thorized users
5 £25, 000 £125, 000
Confidential documents that are pre-
vented from being read by unautho-
rized users
4 £10, 000 £40, 000
Total benefits: £165, 000
software. In addition, each year, 396 hours of non-productive time incurred as
the result of the reduction in organizational efficiency after the implementation
of the MS IRM system (Figure 4.6). In order to translate NPT into monetary
terms, the average salary of £60 per hour is used, therefore, in this study, the
annual cost on NPT amounts to £23, 760. For many projects, this is a conserva-
tive estimate, because of high daily operational rate, for example, the daily rates
of drilling rigs in oil and gas industry. In addition, two administrators have to
be hired to handle the MS IRM system and the requests in the organization. An
administrator’s annual salary is around £32, 000 [56]; therefore, the administra-
tors’ costs are around £64, 000 per year. Training of employees in this case is
assumed to cost £20, 000 per year. The total costs associated with implementing
MS IRM system is listed in Table 4.4.
We put the benefits and costs (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4) associated with im-
plementing MS IRM system into the NPV, the NPV is represented in Section 2.8.
Therefore, the NPV of implementing the MS IRM can be calculated as following
[37]:
NPV at year one (T = 1):
NPV (i, T ) = NPV (0.5, 1) = −K +∑Tt=0 Rt−Ct(1+i)t = −K + R1−C1(1+i)1
= −£21, 121.65 + £165,000−£107,760
(1+0.05)1
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Table 4.4: Costs analysis of the MS IRM product. The costs of MS IRM product
include initial capital expenditure on MS IRM software and associated hardware and
software upgrade cost. In addition, annual operational costs include administrator
salaries, non-productive time associated with the reduction of operational efficiency
and employee training costs.
Initial capital expenditure costs by deploying MS IRM
Type of costs Value
MS IRM software itself £1, 121.65
Upgrade hardware or operating system £20, 000
Total costs: £21, 121.65
Annual operational costs by implementing MS IRM
Type of costs Value
Employee non-productive loss £23, 760
Administrator costs £64, 000
Training employees £20, 000
Total costs: £107, 760
= £33, 392.64
NPV at year two (T = 2):
NPV (i, T ) = NPV (0.5, 2) = −K +∑Tt=0 Rt−Ct(1+i)t = −K + R1−C1(1+i)1 + R2−C2(1+i)2
= −£21, 121.65 + £165,000−£107,760
(1+0.05)1
+ £165,000−£107,760
(1+0.05)2
= £85, 311.01
In which, Rt represents the benefit of year t; Ct represents the cost of year t;
K is the initial capital expenditure. The discount rate i is assumed to be 0.05.
In this studied case, the NPV of implementing MS IRM is larger than 0.
Therefore, the implementation project will bring positive cash flow to the orga-
nization. It is, therefore, recommended to implement MS IRM into the organi-
zation’s network. However, as discussed previously, this is the optimal case, in
which the capital of the organization is unconstrained. For an organization with
limited capital that has many profitable projects, projects with positive NPV
will be compared against each other and the ones that have higher rate of return
might be chosen for investment.
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4.3 Summary
To assist security investors to make sensible investment decisions, a procedure
that can quantitatively evaluate the benefits and costs of implementing enterprise
information security products was proposed. The deployment of MS IRM system
was used as a case study. In this example, the mechanism of MS IRM system
is analysed; flow charts that represent the communication between users and
server, administrator and server are generated. Then human behaviour of staff
members in the organization is studied. In addition, business process is built to
represent the set of ordered activities to be undertaken by staff or other resources
of the organization. A group of security metrics were developed to measure the
effectiveness of the MS IRM system. Furthermore, the stochastic Petri Nets
method is used to simulate and predict the impact of the deployment of the
system on normal business processes. The simulation results provided important
information that the business needed for making decisions on whether or not to
implement this particular type of enterprise information security system.
This procedure was developed for the project in this particular case study
under a set of assumptions; however, it has the potential to be used as a general
practice during the procurement process of information security products. Dif-
ferent assumptions can be made and different parameters can be used based on
the data collection of user behaviour study. These parameters are used in the
stochastic model to tailor the needs and requirements of the security investor.
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Chapter 5
Data Resources in Dynamic
Environments
In chapter 4, we proposed a methodology using stochastic Petri nets for quan-
titative analysis of the effectiveness of the enterprise information security tech-
nologies, and we found that an important advantage of the implementation of
an information security technology system is the reduction of unauthorized at-
tempts to access data resources. However, the previous studies did not consider
the mobility of the users, and the level of exposure to threats of data resources
in different locations.
In this chapter, we will analyse data resources in a dynamic environment, and
we will focus on the location of data resources and the location of users, as well as
security policies in an organization. This study can help the technical experts to
provide a deeper analysis of the detailed security measures required, and help the
decision makers to know the efficiency of a given information security technology.
5.1 Data Resources in an Organization
Figure 5.1 illustrates the way in which users handle the data owned by an orga-
nization. They store sensitive data on their desktop PCs, smart phones or USB
sticks. When such a device is lost, the organization is unable to exert any control
on the information stored on this device. In addition, users can occasionally send
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email messages that contain confidential files as attachments without noticing
that the files should not be distributed, or that the recipient should not see the
files, or that an unintended recipient has been incorrectly selected to receive the
email. Each of these behaviours can cause the digital information to leak outside
the company.
Figure 5.1: Users access data through different devices and in different locations.
Information security technologies1 have been developed to address these con-
cerns. In [57], the authors survey the existing enterprise technologies that control
access to confidential digital data (e.g., USB access control solutions, digital rights
management software, and disk encryption techniques). The researched technolo-
gies use endpoint access control as a means of limiting the maintenance overhead
introduced by unauthorized devices. They also provide auditing options and pre-
vent outsider access through encryption, which can reduce the loss or leaking
of data. It has been found that the various information security measures are
reliant on the cooperation of various people and system components, and it has
been identified that the effect of the information technologies highly depends on
the user behaviour.
1We refer to these information security technologies as access control solutions or identity
and access management technologies.
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5.1.1 Threats
In business processes there are various types of threats that could occur and
lead to the loss or leaking of data. Different threats have different probability of
occurring; in particular, there are two important factors in this respect: accidental
loss, and information theft targeted by criminals. An accidental loss may be
somewhat quantifiable, particularly as it is related to physical devices such as
laptops or smart phones. The targeting of information by criminals will depend
both on the individuals with the capability to access data and their capacity for
criminal behaviour, and an opportunity to perform the crime. Factors influencing
both accidental loss and crime will be changeable over time and hence it becomes
important to consider security related decisions within a wide range of threat
contexts. Information resources are subject to many kinds of threat. Here we
first need to define the threats. Note that, in general, a threat is a natural
disaster, an unintentional act by an individual that causes harm, or a malicious
act by an individual or group of individuals [58; 59].
Figure 5.2: User behaviour impacts on the security of data resources.
Figure 5.2 shows the conditions causing threats which result from the inter-
action between data resources and users behaviour. Here, and later in the paper,
it is assumed that D is the set of data resources in an organization, and d is a
specific element in D. U is the set of all users whose behaviours could be applied
to D, and u is a specific element in U . The user behaviour fall into two cate-
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gories, namely users with desired behaviour, udb ∈ UDB , and users with undesired
behaviour, uub ∈ UUB , i.e.,
U = UDB unionmulti UUB .
The set of threats, including unintentional acts by users that cause harm (e.g.,
device loss and miss-sent messages), is denoted by TS, and ts is a specific threat
in TS. In Figure 5.2, a threat results from an undesired user behaviour applied
to a data resource. Therefore, we have:
TS = D×UUD .
Moreover, a controlled data resource results from a desired user behaviour applied
to a data resource. Therefore, we have:
CD = D×UDB .
In what follows, we will refine the definition of TS and CD, after taking into
account the impact of potential data protection measures adopted by an organi-
zation.
Figure 5.3: Security policy impacts on the security of data resources. The condi-
tions causing threats result from the combination of unprotected data resources and
undesired user behaviour.
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5.1.2 Data Resources Protection Polices
A data resources protection domain consists of all the elements of an organi-
zation that are subject to the same data resources protection policy. One can
identify various information security technologies preventing outsider access to
data resources through access control [57]. Therefore, we consider that there are
two categories of data resulting from the implementation of information security
technologies: protected data, dp ∈ Dp, and unprotected data, dup ∈ Dup , i.e.,
D = Dp unionmultiDup .
The interplay of a data protection policy implemented by an organization with
the behaviour of the users is illustrated in Figure 5.3. It shows some regions
resulting from the combination of the protected and unprotected data resources
with the desired and undesired user behaviours. The regions correspond to the
situations listed in Table 5.1. Looking at Figure 5.3, it is clear that by minimizing
the region resulting from an interaction between unprotected data resources and
undesired user behaviours, one can reduce the level of security threats in the
system.
Table 5.1: The interplay of security policy with the behaviour of users
secure Dp×UDB protected data & desired behaviour
controlled1 Dup×UDB unprotected data & desired behaviour
controlled2 Dp×UUD protected data & undesired behaviour
threat Dup×UUD unprotected data & undesired behaviour
After taking into account the implemented information security technologies
protecting data resources, we can introduce secure data SD as a combination
of protected data and users with desired behaviour, and then refine the threat
model presented in Section 5.1.1, in the following way:
TSdrp = Dup × UUD
SDdrp = Dp × UDB
CDdrp = (Dup × UDB) unionmulti (Dp × UUD)
(5.1)
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5.1.3 Threat Environment
A threat environment generates threat events that may cause, e.g., a data loss
incident. There are several potential threats that could occur and lead to security
incidents involving data, each of which would normally have a different probability
of occurring in different environments. Crucially, the same incident may bring a
different impact to the organization in a different location. For example, a laptop
might be left unattended in a public place allowing passers-by to read confidential
emails, whereas a laptop left unattended in a private space might not result in
any damage to the organization.
To model different threat environments in the system, we will use a set Loc
of locations, with loc ∈ Loc being a specific location. After that the threat model
defined in (5.1) can be further refined to take into account different environments,
in the following way:
TSenv = TSdrp × Loc
SDenv = SDdrp × Loc
CDenv = CDdrp × Loc .
(5.2)
Thus, for instance, TSenv = Dup × UUD × Loc.
5.1.4 Status of the Data Resources
We consider that each threat can lead to an incident [58]. In the model of data
resources we are developing, we will identify security incidents with all system
events in which a user exhibiting an undesired behaviour accessed unprotected
data. We will use a special set I to record such events. In addition, we will
use special sets, SEC and CON , to respectively record events in which data
resources were accessed in a secure and controlled manner. We therefore have:
I ⊆ D × Loc
SEC ⊆ D × Loc
CON ⊆ D × Loc
(5.3)
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where the set of incidents, secure data accesses, and controlled data accesses are
represented together with the locations at which they occurred. Note that the
above definition could be extended to include other relevant information, e.g., the
security level of data resource, or by allowing I, SEC,CON to be multisets (as
in the rest of this paper).
5.1.5 Information Lattices
A lattice for security concerns L = (L,≤) consists of a set L and a partial order
relation ≤ such that, for all l, l′ ∈ L, there exists a least upper bound l ⊕ l′ ∈ L
and a greatest lower bound l ⊗ l′ ∈ L. The lattice is complete if each subset L′
of L has both a least upper bound
∐
L′ and a greatest lower bound
∏
L′ [5; 6].
We will assign a security (or confidentiality) level l ∈ Lsec to each data item
which will in practice be related to the degree of security of its contents. Moreover,
each each location loc ∈ Loc has a security level l(loc) ∈ Lsec, and l(loc) specifies
the highest allowed security level of the data resources located in loc.
In the next section, we will put together into a single definition the various
notions and notations described so far separately.
5.2 Data Resources in Dynamic Environments
The Petri net in Figure 5.4 models a dynamic data resources system. There is
one user and one data resource in location loc1. The user can enter in location
loc2, and then move to location loc3. The data, e.g., can enter in location loc2,
and then move back to loc1. Note that the user and data are represented by
‘black’ tokens for simplicity. In fact, they are ‘coloured’ tokens with associated
attributes, such as security levels.
To facilitate the discussion, the net of Figure 5.4 is decomposed into three
parts: static data resources sub-systems, data flow and user flow. The static
data resources sub-systems show the interaction between users and data at indi-
vidual locations, and the data/user flow sub-systems show the movement of the
data/users between different locations.
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Figure 5.4: Data resources in a dynamic environment. Note that the dashed lines
indicate that the joined circles represent the same place.
We are now ready to introduce a formal model of data resources in a dynamic
environment.
Definition 32 (ddrs). A dynamic data resource system for security analysis is
a tuple:
DDRS = (D,U,Lsec, Loc,A, sinit) (5.4)
where:
- D = Dp unionmultiDup is a finite non-empty set of data resources;
- U = UDB unionmulti UUD is a finite non-empty set of users;
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- Lsec = (L,≤) is a complete security lattice;
- Loc is a finite non-empty set of locations such that each location loc ∈ Loc
has a security level lloc;
- A is a finite set of actions partitioned into three sets, A = AsdrsunionmultiAdf unionmultiAuf ,
each action being a pair
φ = (φin , φout)
of finite multisets over the set
C = U × Loc ∪
D × L× Loc ∪
{i, sec, con} ×D × Loc ;
- sinit is an initial state defined as a finite multiset over the set of tuples C.
In general, a state of DDRS is a finite multiset over the set of tuples C. ♦
Note that the tags {i, sec, con} are used to indicate the (multi)sets I, SEC,CON
discussed in Section 5.1.4.
A data resource can have several copies, and each of these copies can have
a different security level and reside in a different location. We further allow
multiple copies of a single data to be present in a single location. As a result, a
state is a multiset s over the set C rather than a subset of C. Thus, for example,
if s(d, 2, loc) = 4 then we know that, in the current state s, there are 4 copies
of data d with security level 2 residing at location loc. We will also say that
(d, l, loc) is present in state s if s(d, l, loc) > 0. If s(u, loc) = 3, then we interpret
this as saying that there are 3 users with the behaviour u at location loc.
The decomposition of the Petri net of Figure 5.4 into three sub-models is
reflected in the above definition by three types of actions: Asdrs for the static
data resources sub-systems, Adf for the data flow sub-system, and Auf for the
user flow sub-system. They will be presented in detail later on. First, we define
how the system can execute actions, both one-by-one, and in groups of multisets.
Definition 33 (single action executions). An action φ = (φin , φout) is enabled
at state s if φin ≤ s, i.e., if the whole of φin is included in s. Such an action can
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then be executed leading to a new state s′ given by:
s′ = s− φin + φout ,
where (−) and (+) are multiset subtraction and addition, respectively.
We denote this by s
φ−→ s′. ♦
Note that the class of allowed action types may easily be extended to include,
for example, checking for the absence of certain kinds of data.
Definition 34. (multiset actions execution). A multiset of actions Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn}
is enabled at state s if Φin ≤ s, where
Φin = φin1 + . . .+ φ
in
n .
Such an action multiset can then be executed leading to a new state s′ given by:
s′ = s− Φin + Φout ,
where
Φout = φout1 + . . .+ φ
out
n .
We denote this by s
Φ−→ s′. ♦
With such a definition we can define precisely what are the states which can
be reached from the initial one.
Definition 35. (reachable states). The set of reachable states of the dynamic
data resource system DDRS of Definition 32 is the minimal set of states RS
containing the initial state sinit and such that if s ∈ RS and s Φ−→ s′, for some
Φ, then s′ ∈ RS. ♦
The above framework is still not practical, as it allows too general a form of
the actions. We will now address this by introducing specific forms of the actions
in the sets Asdrs , Adf and Auf .
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Figure 5.5: Basic structure of the data resources sub-system at location loc. There
are two users, u1 and u2, and two data resources, d1 and d2.
5.2.1 Static Data Resources Sub-systems
Figure 5.5 shows the structure a data resources sub-system (a central compo-
nent of our model), representing the behaviour of the users and data in a single
location.
The set of actions Asdrs is made up of four distinct kinds of actions:
Asdrs = A
(i)
sdrs unionmultiA(sec)sdrs unionmultiA(con)sdrs unionmultiA(data)sdrs ,
defined in the following way (note that a term of the form (x, . . . , y)@loc denotes
a tuple (x, . . . , y, loc)):
- Each φ = (φin , φout) ∈ A(i)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout = {u@loc, (i, d)@loc}
where u ∈ UUD , d ∈ Dup , l ∈ L and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each φ = (φin , φout) ∈ A(sec)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout =
{
u@loc, (sec, d)@loc,
(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dm, lm)@loc
}
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where u ∈ UDB , d ∈ Dp , l, l1, . . . , lm ∈ L, d1, . . . , dm ∈ D, and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each action φ = (φin , φout) ∈ A(con)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout =
{
u@loc, (con, d)@loc,
(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dm, lm)@loc
}
where u ∈ UDB∧d ∈ Dup or u ∈ UUD∧d ∈ Dp , l, l1, . . . , lm ∈ L, d1, . . . , dm ∈
D, and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each action φ = (φin , φout) ∈ A(data)sdrs is such that
φin = {(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dk, lk)@loc}
φout = {(d′1, l′1)@loc, . . . , (d′m, l′m)@loc} ,
where loc ∈ Loc, d1, . . . , dk, d′1, . . . , d′m ∈ D, and l1, . . . , lk, l′1, . . . , l′m ∈ L.
In the above, we assumed for simplicity that the only faulty behaviour (security
incident) is data loss, and that a user can only access a single data resource at a
time.
Next we consider the dynamic movement of data resources and users.
5.2.2 Data Flow
Data flow security is concerned with the way in which secure information is
allowed to flow through a computing system. Intuitively, the flow is considered
secure if it adheres to a specified security policy.
Each action φ = (φin , φout) ∈ Adf is such that:
φin = {(d1, l1)@loc1, . . . , (dk, lk)@lock}
φout = {(d′1, l′1)@loc′1, . . . , (d′m, l′m)@loc′m} ,
where loc1, . . . , lock, loc
′
1, . . . , loc
′
m ∈ Loc, d1, . . . , dk, d′1, . . . , d′m ∈ D, and l1, . . . , lk,
l′1, . . . , l
′
m ∈ L.
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5.2.3 User Flow
The last type of actions concerns the movement of users between locations. Each
action φ = (φin , φout) ∈ Auf is such that:
φin = {u@loc}
φout = {u′@loc′} ,
where u, u′ ∈ U and loc, loc′ ∈ Loc. Note that it may happen that u 6= u′ if the
user changes the behaviour status when moving from one location to another.
Note, finally, that in practice the actions of the system can be specified in more
convenient way, for example, by using guards and parameters. This is illustrated
in the Petri net representations where transitions use guards and arcs are labelled
by parameters (variables).
5.2.4 System Security
We have defined general notions related to the syntax and operational semantics
of a dynamic data resource system model. It allows one to capture the basic
notion of security across the different locations.
Definition 36. Let DDRS be a dynamic data resource system model as in (5.4).
A state s of DDRS is secure if l ≤sec lloc, for every (d, l)@loc present in s.
Moreover, DDRS is secure if all its reachable states are secure. ♦
That is, a state is secure if all the copies of entities present in the state reside
in different locations without causing security violation. One can state a general
security policy guaranteeing the security of data flow model. Such a policy is
formulated by placing a suitable condition on the actions of the model.
Theorem 3. Let DDRS be a dynamic data resource system model as in (5.4)
such that the following hold:
- For every action φ ∈ A(sec)sdrs ∪ A(con)sdrs , we have:∐
{l1, . . . , lm} ≤sec l .
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- For every action φ ∈ A(data)sdrs , we have:∐
{l′1, . . . , l′m} ≤sec
∏
{l1, . . . , lk} .
- For every action φ ∈ Adf , we have:
{loc′1, . . . , loc′m} ⊆ {loc1, . . . , lock}
and, for every loc ∈ {loc′1, . . . , loc′m}, we have:∐
{l′i | loc′i = loc} ≤sec
∏
{lj | locj = loc} .
Then DDRS is secure provided that sinit is secure. ♦
The above result can only be applied in specific cases; in general, we need to
verify that a given system specification yields a secure system, e.g., by applying
a suitable model checking techniques.
5.3 An Example
We will now present an example to illustrate the structure and behaviour of a
dynamic data resource system. We assume that two employees, A and B, are on
a business trip. Moreover, there are two data resources, d1 ∈ Dp and d2 ∈ Dup ,
which they need to use, and that these data resources are kept on two mobile
devices.
During the trip, the employees need to travel between three different locations
during the trip, loc1, loc2 and loc3, and access the data whenever they need them.
We assume that the behaviour of employee A is captured by u1 ∈ UUD in loc1 ,
and by u2 ∈ UDB in loc2 and loc3 . On the other hand, the behaviour of employee
B is captured by u2 in all three locations.
It is further assumed that there are security levels l1, l2, l3 with the ordering
l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 and that:
- the security level of the two data resources is l2; and
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Figure 5.6: A Petri net model of the example system consisting of two users, two
data resources, and three locations.
- the security levels of the three locations are as follows: lloc1 = lloc2 = l2 and
lloc3 = l1.
The structure and dynamics (possible actions) of the example system are
represented by the Petri net in Figure 5.6. The diagram also shows the initial
state of the system.
The two employees are represented by two tokens in a place labelled loc1, one
token being u1 (for employee A) and the other u2 (for employee B). The leftmost
sub-net shows how the users can move between different locations (e.g., it is not
possible to move directly from loc1 to loc3, but one can achieve this through an
intermediate move to loc2).
The data resources are represented by the two tokens in a different place la-
belled loc1. It follows from the security levels of the data resources and locations
that data resources can never enter loc3. Note that the security policy is rep-
resented by the guard l ≤ lloc3 associated with the transition incoming to the
bottom place (labelled loc3) in the middle sub-net.
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 depict three reachable states of the example system:
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Figure 5.7: A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc1.
Figure 5.8: A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc2.
- Figure 5.7: (i) the undesired behaviour of A at loc1, combined with the
unprotected status of d2, has led to an incident in which d2 is lost; (ii) the
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Figure 5.9: A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc3.
undesired behaviour of A at loc1, combined with the protected status of
d1, has led to a controlled interaction; and (iii) the desired behaviour of
B at loc1, combined with the protected status of d1, has led to a secure
interaction.
- Figure 5.8: the desired behaviour of A and B at loc2, combined with the
protected status of d1, has led to secure interactions.
- Figure 5.9: both A and B can move to loc3, but d1 is prevented from doing
so by the security policy as discussed above. As a result, the employees
cannot interact with d1 in this location.
5.4 Probabilistic Behaviour
When the users or data resources move from one location to another, their move-
ments might follow probabilistic distribution.
For example, in the system discussed in Section 5.3, users positioned in loc2
can move to loc1 or to loc3. Also, if a data resource with security level l residing
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in loc3 conforms to the security policy, i.e., l ≤ lloc1 and l ≤ lloc2 , the data can
move to loc1 or loc2.
Assuming that we know the probability distributions for choosing the next
locations in such cases, it is possible to turn the Petri net model outlined above
into a suitable probabilistic or stochastic Petri net which can then be simulated
and evaluated using suitable automated tools.
5.5 Summary
We proposed a system model for data resources in a business organization based
on the location of different classes of data resources as well as the users. In this
model, the status of the data resources are divided into different classes in order
to analyse the existing or planned security policies. We also illustrated how such
system model can be represented by a Petri net which can then be used to track
and analyse the data resources and users in different locations using suitable tools
and methods. The proposed modelling technique would help to move the debate
from discussion of claims made by the information security technology vendors
to a better (rigorous) understanding of the effectiveness of information security
technology and security policies.
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Chapter 6
Performance Modelling and
Analysis of Information Security
Technology
In this chapter, we will consider the trade-off between performance and secu-
rity when implementing information security technologies in the organization’s
network. Firstly, an approximate analytical model of the information security
system comprising a server and an administrator is proposed and evaluated using
queueing theory. A non-productive time (NPT) function for implementing infor-
mation security technologies is also given. Moreover, a simulation model based
on stochastic Petri nets is proposed and evaluated. Secondly, we consider the
case of multiple administrators and provide suitable analytical and simulation
models which are then compared. Thirdly, a cost function is proposed to analyze
the effect of varying the number of administrators in the information system.
This part of the study can help an information security manager to estimate the
necessary number of administrators providing system support, and the service
capacity that has to be guaranteed by the organization in order to satisfy a given
number of users.
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6.1 Implementing Information Security Technolo-
gies
In [57], the authors survey the existing enterprise technologies that control access
to confidential digital data (e.g., USB access control solutions, digital rights man-
agement software, and disk encryption techniques). The researched technologies
use endpoint access control as a means of limiting the maintenance overhead intro-
duced by unauthorized devices. The technologies are installed from a centralized
security station, sending client-side installations directly to user workstations.
They provide auditing options and prevent outsider access through encryption.
The various information security solutions follow a model of centralized control,
where access policies are recorded at a single location from which they are passed
to end users when they interact with the network, and administrators have the
highest access rights. The various information security measures rely on the co-
operation of various people and system components, thus carrying them out has
an impact on the overall productivity of the organization.
Figure 6.1: Relationships between administrators, users and servers.
Figure 6.1 shows a possible model representing the relationships between
users, administrators and servers when implementing information security tech-
nologies in the organization’s network: (1) When a user tries to access resource, a
request is sent to the server. (2) The server attempts to validate the user and, if
the user does not pass the authentication procedure, the user is denied the access
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the resource. (3) If the access is denied, the user contacts the administrator ask-
ing for help. (4) The administrator contacts the server. (5) If the user should be
allowed to access the resource, the administrator creates the appropriate access
rights for the user, or changes the usage policy for this user in the server. (6)
Finally, the administrator sends the access rights to the user.
In our models and experiments presented in the rest of this paper, we have
adopted a simplified version of the model depicted in Figure 6.1.
6.2 Queueing Network Model
Figure 6.2 shows an information security system modelled by a simple queueing
system with two queue stations (the server and the administrator).
In the system, each user’s request is assumed to have a duration specified by a
negative exponential distribution with a given mean: 1/ru is the frequency for a
user send an access request, 1/rser is the average time it takes the server to serve
a user’s request, and 1/ra is the average time it takes the administrator to help
a non-active user. N is the maximum number of users admitted for processing.
If there are more than N requests present, the ones that do not occupy a thread
wait in an external FIFO queue.
In the diagram, p (0 < p ≤ 1) is the probability that a user can pass the
user authentication procedure on the server and become an active user, 1 − p is
the probability that a user cannot pass the user authentication and becomes an
non-active user who needs help from the administrator.
Figure 6.2: A queueing theory model of an information security system.
When the external queue is non-empty, the system behaves like a closed queue-
ing network (Figure 6.3), with N requests circulating between the users and the
system.
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Figure 6.3: A closed queueing theory model of an information security system.
6.3 Approximate Analytical Solution
Let us assume that there are k user requests circulating between the server and
the administrator (k = 1, . . . , N). Suppose that the circulation continues for a
long time, i.e. the system reaches a steady state with k user requests. Then the
server queue would behave like an M/M/1 queue with a bounded buffer of size
k. The load ρser on the server is:
ρser =
ruk
rserp
(6.1)
Using the existing results [14] for the M/M/1/k queue yields the average number
of requests in the server:
Lser =
ρser
1− ρser ×
1− (k + 1)ρkser + kρk+1ser
1− ρk+1ser
(6.2)
The steady state probability Πk that there are exactly k requests waiting for a
response from the server is:
Πk =
(1− ρser)ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
(6.3)
Therefore, the state-dependent throughput of the server when there are k requests
in it, Tser , is given by:
Tser = (1− Πk)× ruk
p
=
1− ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
× ruk
p
(6.4)
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The probability User that the server is busy, given that there are k requests in
the system is:
User =
Tser
rser
=
1− ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
× ruk
rserp
(6.5)
The average response time, Wser , of a request that is admitted into the server
can be found from Little’s theorem:
Wser =
Lser
Tser
(6.6)
The entire system is in a steady state. Thus, the load on the administrator, ρadm
is:
ρadm =
(1− p)ruk
rap
(6.7)
Therefore, the state-dependent utility of the administrator when there are k re-
quests in the system, Tadm , is given by:
Uadm =
1− ρkadm
1− ρk+1adm
× (1− p)ruk
rap
(6.8)
and the average number of requests on the administrator is given by [14]:
Ladm =
ρadm
1− ρadm ×
1− (A+ 1)ρAadm + AρA+1adm
1− ρA+1adm
(6.9)
where, A = (1− p)k.
The average response time, Wadm , of a request that is admitted into the
administrator can be found from Little’s theorem:
Wadm =
Ladm
Tadm
(6.10)
The non-productive time (NPT) in the organization is the average number of
requests in the server and administrator in an interval of time:
NPT = (
Lser
rq
+ Lser + Ladm)× l (6.11)
where l is the period of time users spend in the system, and 1/rq is the average
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time taken by a user to send an access request.
6.3.1 Comparing Analytical and Simulation Results
We have compared the above approximate analytical solution with simulation
results obtained using the Mo¨bius system [55]. The performance of the system
under different loading conditions and parameter settings was examined in a series
of numerical and simulation experiments. The main purpose of the simulations
was to evaluate the accuracy of the analytical solution and, at the same time, to
validate the modelling technique based on stochastic Petri nets.
In this model, we will increase the number of users up to tens of thousands,
using a discrete approximation to keep the state space limited. If we assume
100 active users circle around in the model, each representing a group of users
as determined by a model multiplier. By incorporating the multiplier correctly
in the various transition rates, we can approximate the behaviour of a system
with tens of thousands of users by a model that has less than one million states.
Arguably, one million states is still a considerable amount, but easily manageable
with Mo¨bius [55].
Figure 6.4: A stochastic Petri net model of an information security system. Infor-
mally, the middle transition produces a token with in one of the two output places with
probabilities p and 1− p, respectively.
Figure 6.4 shows the structure of a stochastic Petri nets model representing
information security scenario we discussed above. The model consists of three
places and three timed transitions. Timed transitions are associated with random
exponential distributed firing delays. Authorized Users try to access protected
resources every 1
ru
unit time, each attempt taking 1
rq
units of time. We use Tu to
control the frequency of access requests sent to the Server by a user. The time
taken to access the protected resources is given by Tser . If the user can pass the
authentication process, then the user can use the resource, but if the user cannot
access the resource, the user has to contact the Administrator for help. After
97
obtaining such help (the time taken is given by Tadm), the user can try to access
the resource again.
The behaviour of the model can be measured by the impulse rewards model
and rate rewards model, which are supported by the Mo¨bius software. The
throughput of a transition is computed according to the formula which is de-
scribed in Section 2.3.2
∑
a∈Tr CaN
a
[t,t+l]. The number of tokens in sets of places
is computed according to the formula
∑
v∈P(Pl,N)R(v)M
v
[t,t+l]. The time scale of
the model is expressed in minutes, i.e. when we run the model one time unit in
Mo¨bius represents one minute in real working time.
To measure the throughput of the server, the throughput of a transition per
unit of time Tser was computed in average interval of time, and then we could
calculate the utility of the server by using the equation (6.5). To measure the
throughput of the administrator, the throughput of the transition per unit of
time Tadm was computed in average interval of time, and then we could calculate
the utility of the administrator by using the equation (6.8).
As the number of the parameters is quite high, some of them were kept fixed
throughout. These were: the probability that a user passes the authentication
procedure (p = 0.7); the average time a user needs to send an access request
( 1
ru
= 100); and the average time it takes a user to send a request ( 1
rq
= 0.25).
Figure 6.5 shows the utility of the server against the number of users for both
the simulation and approximate analytical approaches for various values of rser
and ra. Increasing the value of rser and ra corresponds to increasing the speed of
user access to the resource.
Figure 6.6 shows the utility of the administrator against the numbers of the
users for both the simulation and approximate analytical approaches for various
values of rser and ra. The results show that there are obvious benefits from
increasing the server and administrator speed. If the target utilization of the
administrator is 0.72, with rser = 15 and ra = 4 one can serve at most 640 users.
After increasing the server rate and administrator’s service rate to respectively
rser = 30 and ra = 8, the utility of the administrator can increase to 0.71, which
is close to the target with 1280 users.
Let us now consider one year of work after the deployment of the information
security technologies in the network system of an organization, i.e., we consider
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Figure 6.5: Utility of the server w.r.t. the number of users in the system. p =
0.7, 1ru = 100. The utility increases significantly when the number of users served by
the server and administrator increases.
96000 time units in the stochastic Petri net model (this corresponds to 40 weeks
of work, each working week having 40 working hours). To measure the NPT,
the time users spend in any place other than Users is computed. The NPT also
includes the time the user takes for sending an access request ( 1
rq
).
Figure 6.7 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the number of users for various
values of rser and ra. Increasing the value of rser and ra is equivalent to increasing
the speed of users access to the resource. The NPT includes: the time spent on
sending an access request and authentication procedures, and the time spent on
waiting for a response from administrator.
If the target maximum NPT is 120000 time units, one can try to build the
system with rser = 15 and ra = 4. Then the system can serve 320 users and
the NPT is around 102653 time units which is below the target. However, if we
increase the rates to rser = 30 and ra = 8, the system can serve 640 users and
the NPT is around 102669 time units.
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Figure 6.6: Utility of the administrator w.r.t. the number of users in the system.
p = 0.7, 1ru = 100. The utility increases significantly when the number of users served
by the server and administrator increases.
6.4 Multiple Administrators
In the above, we proposed an approximate analytical model for implementing
information security technologies. We considered one server and one administra-
tor. In what follows, we consider multiple administrators who provide help with
access control problems.
We assume that there are K administrators, each of which can serve one user
request at a time, independently of the others (Figure 6.8). We want to know
if it is beneficial to increase the number of administrators, or to increase the
operational speed of the administrators. It is well known that for an M/M/K
queue, it is preferable to have one administrator serving at the rate µ rather than
K administrators serving at the rate µ/K [14]. This is because if there are fewer
than K requests in the queue, then some of the administrators will be idle, thus
reducing the overall service rate.
Consider first the administrator subsystem, with j requests circulating be-
tween the server and administrators, j = 0, 1, . . . , (1 − p)N , where N is the
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Figure 6.7: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of
information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100. NPT increases significantly when
the number of users served by the system increases.
Figure 6.8: A closed queueing theory model of an information security system, with
N users and K administrators.
maximum number of user requests, and p is the probability that a user can pass
the user authentication on the server.
Suppose that the circulation continues for a long time and the subsystem
reaches a steady state with j requests. If there is one administrator in the system
and j user requests in the subsystem, the approximation becomes an M/M/1/./A
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queue (A = (1− p)N). Hence the balance equations become [14]:
(A− j)ruΠj = raΠj+1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A (6.12)
where Πj is the steady state probability that there are exactly j user requests
waiting for a response from the administrator.
Now we increase the number of parallel administrators in the model. The
model becomes an M/M/K/./A queue, where K is the number of administrators.
Therefore, the balance equations become [14]:
(A− j)ruΠj = (j + 1)raΠj+1, 0 ≤ j < K (6.13)
(A− j)ruΠj = KraΠj+1, K ≤ j < A (6.14)
We can calculate Π0:
Π0 =
[
K−1∑
j=0
A!ρj
(A− j)!j! +
A∑
j=K
A!ρj
(A− j)!K!Kj−K
]−1
(6.15)
The average queue length can then be calculated by [14]:
Ladm =
A∑
j=1
jΠj (6.16)
= A!Π0
[
K−1∑
j=1
ρjj
(A− j)!j! +
A∑
j=K
ρjj
(A− j)!K!Kj−K
]
(6.17)
Each of the users submits requests to administrators at the rate (1−p)ru
p
. Therefore,
the throughput Tadm is [14]:
Tadm = (A− Ladm)ruA
p
(6.18)
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and the average response time of administrators, Wadm , becomes:
Wadm =
A
Tadm
− p
ruA
(6.19)
The non-productive time (NPT) in the organization can be calculated using
the equation (6.11).
6.4.1 Comparing Analytical and Simulation Results
We again used the Mo¨bius software [55; 60] to simulate the behaviour of the
approximate analytical model, and to compare the simulation and analytical re-
sults.
Figure 6.9 shows the structure of a stochastic Petri net for the analytical model
we have just discussed, which consists of five places, four timed transitions, and
one instantaneous transition. Authorized Users try to access resources every
1
ru
time units during working hours (the time taken is given by Tser). If the
user cannot access the resource, administrators are contacted for help. Here we
use Thelp to control the probability with which the users are handled by different
administrators. There are eight administrators (Adm1, . . . , Adm8 ), each of which
can serve one user request at a time, independently of the others. The throughput
and average response time can be computed as in Section 6.3.1.
Figure 6.9: A stochastic Petri net model of an information security system with eight
administrators. Note that the ‘thin’ transition with eight output places takes no time
to execute, i.e. it is instantaneous.
As before, some parameters were kept fixed: the probability that a user passes
the authentication procedure (p = 0.7); the frequency with which a user sends
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access requests ( 1
ru
= 100) (i.e., a user sends a request every 100 time units); and
the average time it takes for a user to send an access request ( 1
rq
= 0.25).
Figure 6.10 shows the average load on the administrators against the number
of users for K = 8 with ra = 0.5, and K = 4 with ra = 1.
Figure 6.10: Average load on the administrators w.r.t. the number of users in the
system. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15.
Figure 6.11 shows the average response time of the administrators w.r.t. the
numbers of user for K = 8 with ra = 0.5, and K = 4 with ra = 1.
Consider now one year of the deployment of the information security tech-
nology in the network system, i.e., 96000 time units in the stochastic Petri net
model.
Figure 6.12 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the numbers of users for
ra = 0.5 with K = 8, and ra = 1 with K = 4. NPT increased significantly
when the service speed of the administrators is slow; in other words, increasing
the speed of the administrators reduces the NPT of the staff members in the
organization.
Figure 6.13 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the number of administrators
with 400 users in the system. The system reaches a steady state with five admin-
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Figure 6.11: Average response time of the administrators w.r.t. the number of users
in the system. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15.
Figure 6.12: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of
information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15.
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istrators in the system. Increasing the number of administrators will reduce the
NPT in the organization. However, the administrators will often be idle in such
a case.
Figure 6.13: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of
information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15, N = 400, ra = 0.25.
6.5 The Cost Model for Administrators
Now we introduce a cost function which needs to be optimized. This function
is based on the assumption that there is a cost of the users’ waiting time and
a competing cost of providing resources, e.g., salaries of administrators, and ad-
ministrators’ training expenditure. This gives rise to the following simple cost
function [14; 61]:
C = c1Ladm + c2Kra, c1, c2 ≥ 0 (6.20)
The cost rates ci(i = 1, 2) are non-negative constant, which are dependent on the
particular system, or depend on the type of quality of service contract that is in
place. If c1 is large, in order to keep the total cost C low, Ladm should be small
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[14]. At the same time, if c2 is large, in order to keep the total cost C low, Kra
should be small [14]. However, the coefficients ci(i = 1, 2) are not necessarily op-
timal, because the load of the administrators also plays a key role in determining
the best strategy, since the service time and the number of administrators also
influence the load of the administrators. In general, if the organizations want
to improve the responsiveness of the system, they would increase c1, and if they
want to minimize running costs, they would increase c2.
6.5.1 Analytical Results
We now illustrate the cost function we proposed above using the previous ana-
lytical results. Figure 6.14 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of users. It is clear
that under the parameter values with ra = 0.25, the cost rises rapidly at around
320 users, which is the approximate maximum capacity the administrators can
handle before the performance starts to degrade. Under the parameter values
with ra = 0.5, the cost rises at around 640 users. Therefore, doubling the service
rate from ra = 0.25 to ra = 0.5 effectively doubles the capacity of the system.
In a small system, when N < 320, the cost function is dominated by c2Kra.
Therefore, the cost is greater for faster administrators. The reason is that the
administrators will often be idle, and the system is not making efficient use of
resources.
Figure 6.15 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of users. It is easy to see, under
the parameter values with ra = 0.25, the cost rises rapidly at around 320 users
for all cases (c2 = 0.1, 1, 10). In the above pictures, 320 is critical point because
of the parameters we put into the model, if the value of the parameters change,
320 would not be the critical point.
Figure 6.16 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of administrators in the system.
In this experiment, the number of users is fixed. The larger c2 results in a
decreasing cost before the optimal point and an increasing rate after the point.
For 400 users, in the case of c2 = 1 the optimal value is K = 17, which gives
the minimal cost of 9.62. In the case of c2 = 10 the optimal value is K = 10,
which gives the minimal cost of 35.29. When information security managers make
the trade-off between security and cost, the balance point here is the value of K
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Figure 6.14: The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queueing network
model. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15,K = 8, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 1.
Figure 6.15: The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queueing network
model. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser = 15,K = 8, ra = 0.25, c1 = 0.5.
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Figure 6.16: The cost w.r.t. the number of administrators. p = 0.7, 1ru = 100, rser =
15, N = 400, ra = 0.25, c1 = 0.5.
where the cost is minimal. Therefore, the security manager could choose K = 17
and K = 10 when c2 = 1 and c2 = 10, respectively.
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Productivity Loss in
the Organization
As above we can see non-productive time (NPT) associated with enterprise in-
formation security technologies is related to a variety of parameters, which are
affected by the security policies and user behaviour in the organization. Since
these parameters have an impact on the organization efficiency loss, it is of criti-
cal business importance for corporations to find out which parameter result in a
large contribution to the overall output variability, so that enterprise-wide secu-
rity budget can be optimized to these factors in order to minimize the cost [62].
Sensitivity analysis is particularly useful in this situation.
The methodology of sensitivity analysis is well developed and widely used in
project development and business strategy [63; 64]. In this part, we will analyze
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the relative importance of each parameters that have an impact on the organi-
zation efficiency by applying sensitivity analysis to the stochastic Petri nets (or
queueing theory) model.
6.6.1 The Approach
To get the aim of the sensitivity analysis, three main steps are proposed:
Step 1: A base case model should be built to reflect the business process by
implementing an information security technology. The base case should incorpo-
rate the best bet values of input parameters, following an initial run with a base
case model, a belief about the optimal strategy can be formed [66]. This belief
is based on the modeller’s perceptions of probability distribution of profit for the
preferred strategy.
Step 2: Key parameters of the base case model should be identified. The
domain for each of the input parameters of the model should include base case
value, maximum value, and minimum value.
The input key parameters of the base case model is a finite set: X = {x1 . . . xn}.
We use xbasi denotes the base case value of input parameter xi, x
max
i denotes the
maximum value of xi, and x
min
i denotes the minimum value of xi. In addition,
the output of the base case is denoted by ybas.
Step 3: When analysing the sensitivity of xi, the parameter is varied by
using its maximum or minimum value, while leaving all other parameters at base
values. We calculate the output of the model, and assess the influences of each
input parameter relative to the output of the model1. The sensitivity of xi can
be calculated as:
Positive part : +Sxi =
ymaxi −ybas
xmaxi −xbasi
Negative part : −Sxi = y
bas−ymini
xbasi −xmini
1The units of measurement of different parameters might not be comparable, so there
cannot be absolute scopes with respect to changes in different parameters. This problem can
be overcome by measuring the percentage change in the output, divided by the percentage
change in the input parameter. Therefore, the sensitivity coefficient is the ratio of the change
in output to the change in input while all other parameters remain constant
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where, xmaxi and x
min
i correspond to the output values y
max
i and y
min
i , respectively.
6.6.2 Case Study
In this part, enterprise digital rights management (EDRM) is used as a case study
(more information can be found in Section 4.2).
6.6.2.1 Define Base Case Model
The model we will use is in Section 6.3: When authorized users try to open doc-
uments, the user needs a username and password in order to login to the system,
which takes time. If the user can open the document they become an active user.
However, if the user cannot pass the document authentication or the user cannot
pass the user authentication, the user would contact the administrators for help.
After gets help from the administrators, the user would try to use the document
again.
The input parameters for the base case model are in Table 6.1. The values
of these parameters are gathered using interviews, experiments, and literature
reviews; more details about these data can be found in Section 6.6.2.2. The
system reaches steady state under the parameters in the table, based on equation
(6.1) and (6.7):
ρser =
ruk
rserp
= 0.00007 < 1
ρadm =
(1−p)ruk
rap
= 0.0132 < 1
where, 1
ru
= 120, k = 50, rser = 6000, ra = 0.222, p = 0.993.
We measure the NPT, using equation (6.11), within one year of the deploy-
ment of EDRM in the organization’s network system, i.e., 96000 time units in
the stochastic Petri nets model. A middle-size corporation that has 50 authorized
users will incur about 15.271 hours of NPT, which is associated with the total
waiting time lost on the information help desk, and the total authentication time
loss of the corporation.
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Table 6.1: The input parameters of the base case model, which can be gathered using
interviews, experiments and literature reviews.
Parameters Value
Number of authorized users in the corporation 50
Number of documents, a user might use every day on average 4
Number of normal working hours per day 8
Number of working weeks per year 40
Average time service need to serve each user 0.01 seconds
Average time administrators need to help each user 4.5 minutes
Average time users need to spend to pass user authentication 7.33 seconds
Percentage of time when authorized users experience a login
system failure and attempt ask administrator for help
0.70 %
Number of administrators in the organization 1
6.6.2.2 Define Key Parameters
We now need to understand how the parameters affect the NPT of the corpora-
tion.
There are nine input parameters in the model (Table 6.1). The number of
authorized users in the corporation, the number of documents that an authorized
user might use every day on average, the number of normal working hours per
day, and the number of working weeks per year are invariant input parameters of
the model. These four parameters depend entirely on the size and business type of
different corporations. Therefore, the values of these parameters are determined
by literature based assumptions.
With one administrator in the system, the system can reach steady state;
therefore, the number of administrator also set as invariant parameter.
The other four input parameters of the model are variable numbers. They
can be changed by the security policies of the organization. These parameters
could be adjusted independently. Table 6.2 lists the four parameters that will be
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Table 6.2: The value of each input parameter in the model for the sensitivity analysis.
The base value incorporates the best bet values of the parameters, and the parameters
are varied by their maximum and minimum values.
Parameters Highest value Base value Lowest value
1. Average time service re-
sponse time
0.14 seconds 0.01 seconds 0.001 seconds
2. Average time administra-
tors need to help each user
10 minutes 4.5 minutes 1 minutes
3. Average time users need
to spend to pass user au-
thentication
17 seconds 7.33 seconds 4 seconds
4. Percentage of time when
authorized users experience
a login system failure and
attempt ask administrator
for help
26.1% 0.7 % 0%
investigated in the sensitivity analysis.
In Table 6.2, parameters 1 & 4 are based on the literature review; parameter
2 is based on an interview; parameters 3 is based on an experiment.
Parameter 1: The values of this parameter are the measurements from a real
Google service [67]. The Google search system updates query results interactively
as the user types, performing the search and showing the results within a few tens
of milliseconds. A request fan out from a root to a large number of leaf servers
and merging responses via a request-distribution tree. From a real Google service
[67], each server typically responds in 10 ms (xbas1 = 0.01sc). The maximum
response time is 140 ms (xmax1 = 0.14sc), and the minimum response time is 1ms
(xmin1 = 0.001sc).
Parameter 2: This interview is from Newcastle University. All the students
in the university have their own username and password to access facilities, com-
puters, and network in the campus. When students experienced username and
password issues, they would go to the University’s information help desk ask for
help.
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In the interview, the technical staff member in the information help desk
claimed that: It takes 1 or 2 minutes for the staff change a student’s password,
after changing the password, the password is available for use immediately. Cre-
ating a new account for a student would take 5 or 10 minutes, which would also be
available for immediate use. If the username and password of enterprise Digital
Rights Management product (EDRM) belong to the campus domain, the proce-
dure to creating or changing the username and password would be the same as
normal password changing and creating procedure.
In our study, the following assumption is made: after help desk staff change
or create a username and password for a user, the user can use the username and
password to open protected documents immediately; the values of the parameters
are uniform in distribution, and then the base case of parameter 2 is: xbas2 =
1+2+5+10
4
= 4.5 , which means the average time technical staff spend to change or
create a username and password is 4.5 minutes. The maximum time cost is 10
minutes (xmax2 = 10); and the minimum time cost is 1 minutes (x
min
2 = 1).
Parameter 3: The participants in the experiment were 30 students in Newcas-
tle University: 5 PhD students, 3 MSc students and 12 undergraduate students.
System logs of their user web-based e-mail accounts were examined in the summer
term at a computer cluster and students’ offices. Participants used their user-
name and password to log into their web-based e-mail accounts to check their
e-mail.
From the username and password setting rules in the university: “The login
name is made up of ‘a’ or ‘n’ followed by the middle seven characters of the
Student Number”, “The way to set a password: you need something which is
memorable, but not guessable. Think of a phrase of eight words (or more) which
contains at least one upper case (capital) letter and at least one number, and
then use the initial letters of the phrase” [68].
Out of the 30 participants, the minimum time cost to login into their student
account is 4 seconds (xmin3 = 4). The maximum time cost is 17 seconds (x
max
3 =
17), and the average time cost is 7.33 seconds (xbas3 = 7.33). The time cost of
each student depended on the length of the username and password, the strength
of the password, the character restrictions of the password and the frequency of
using and changing the username and password [69; 70; 71].
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Figure 6.17: The tornado chart is the sensitivity of four key variant parameters in the
model. The x-axis is the percentage change from the base case model of the sensitivity
analysis. This analysis is associated with the input parameters in Table 6.2.
Parameter 4: This parameter is based on the experiment in University College
London. They found that there are approximately 0.7% of login attempts that
can be expected to result in a help desk call, where passwords are re-set via
the information help desk [72]. The highest percentage of password reminder is
26.1%, and the lowest percentage of password reminder is 0%, i.e., xbas4 = 0.7%,
xmax4 = 26.1%, and x
min
4 = 0%.
6.6.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity is calculated as the ratio between the relative change of model output
and the relative change of an input parameter (Section 6.6.1).
Figure 6.17 shows the results of sensitive analysis for three parameters in
Table 6.2. It has been found that a small change of parameter 4 (the percentage
of time when authorized users experience a login system failure) contributes most
to output variability. Parameter 3 (the average time users need to login to the
system every time when they use the document) gives the smallest relative change
in the NPT.
The information security policies determine the value of the paramters and
affect the business process of the organization. For example, document classifi-
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cation polices associated with the confidentiality will affect the availability of the
documents. A strict document classification policy without an effective manage-
ment of the documents has the potential of delaying the business process when
authorized users cannot open a needed document and have to wait for help from
administrators. Organizations enforces security policies that ensure maximum
protection of their information assets, e.g., frequently change user passwords,
and the rules to set the passwords. However, users are disturbed when system
policies do not accept their preferred password or oblige them to change it fre-
quently, as users tend to forget their passwords [73; 74]. When users forget their
password, they would try different passwords based on their memory or the out-
put of the authentication system. Therefore, good password security policies can
help to decrease the NPT by reducing the average time users need to spend in
order to pass user authentication.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we provided an approximate analytical model for investigating
different implementations of information security technologies. We have also pro-
vided a corresponding simulation model based on stochastic Petri nets. The two
approaches have been compared through a series of experiments which demon-
strated that the results they can supply are very similar. Hence one can conclude
that the approximate analytical solution is sound. Moreover, we can conclude
that the simulation technique based on stochastic Petri nets can be relied upon
when it comes to the evaluation of, e.g., productivity loss caused by the intro-
duction of security technologies.
We proposed functions to estimate the non-productive time (NPT) in an or-
ganization resulting from the implementation of security technologies, and the
cost function for the administrators in the information help desk.
Queueing theory was used to analyse the implementation of information secu-
rity technologies, and stochastic Petri nets were used to simulate the approach.
The effect of several controllable parameters on the performance of the system
was examined in a series of numerical and simulation experiments.
Sensitivity analysis is used to determine which of the parameters exerts the
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most influence on the NPT of an corporation, in order to help information security
managers to balance the weight of information security expenses, and make well
informed security investment decisions. Proper data collection methodologies
were used, based on the nature of each input parameter, and EDRM was used as
a case study. In this study, each parameter is assigned by value. Different values
of the input parameters would lead to different results.
Mo¨bius system [55] is used to provide the simulation results. We found that
Mo¨bius can not handle more than one million states. Therefore, in these models,
we assume 100 active users circle around in the model, each representing a group
of users as determined by a model multiplier. By incorporating the multiplier
correctly in the various transition rates, we can approximate the behaviour of a
system with tens of thousands of users by a model that has less than one million
states. However, one million states is still a considerable amount, but easily
manageable with Mo¨bius [55].
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Chapter 7
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss related work on quantitative analysis of information
flow and information security technologies.
7.1 Information Flow Security
There has been significant activity recently around the questions of how to build
a secure service-based system, and how to measure the secure information flow
in the programming language. This section gives a overview of the related work
and provides a context for our study.
The Bell-LaPadula model [20] is a state machine model which is used to
enforce access control in government and military applications. In this model,
the entities in the information system are divided into subjects and objects. The
notion of a secret state is defined, and it is proven that each state transition
preserves security by moving from secret state to secure state by proving the
system satisfies the security objectives of the model. A system state is defined
to be secure, if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in
accordance with a security policy. The paper [75] applied Bell-LaPadula model
to work-flow security, and Petri nets were used to model the work-flow. However,
[75] does not extend to considering the deployment of resources blocks within a
work-flow across a set of computational resources. In [76], the author proposed
an extended Petri net formalism called information flow security net (IFS), to
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provide a way of modelling information flow security policies expressed through
the Petri net structure. Later, in [77], the author proposed another security
model, called security Coloured Petri net (SCPN), derived from the IFS net to
give a better and more compact representation to efficiently analyse information
flow. Then, the paper [18] proposed to partition work-flows over a set of available
clouds in such a way that security requirements are met. This approach was based
on a multi-level security model that extends Bell-LaPadula to encompass cloud
computing. The authors investigated work-flow transformations that are needed
when data is communicated between clouds. However, [18] does not consider the
concurrency of the events or the execution of tasks in the system.
There exist different methods for the flow-sensitive analysis of programs: In
[78], the authors first showed that the data manipulated by a program can be
constrained with security level, which naturally assumes the structure of a par-
tially ordered set. Moreover, this partially ordered set is a lattice under certain
conditions [5]. The paper [6] presented a lattice-based framework for describ-
ing information and flow. In [79], the author first built a formal correspondence
between non-interference and mutual information, and established a connection
between Shannon’s information theory and state-machine models of information
flow in computer system. In [80], the authors devised a new information the-
oretic definition of information flow and channel capacity. In [81], the authors
present a notion of soundness for the system that can be viewed as a form of non-
interference. Clark, et all. [82; 83; 84; 85] proposed that Shannon’s information
theory be used to measure the information leakage in imperative programming
languages.
Information hiding systems are used to formally analyse the information-
hiding properties of protocols and programs. In [16; 24; 25], the authors proposed
to use Petri Net modelling technique to specify the opacity of information flow,
and adapted opacity to transition system. In [86], the authors presented a prob-
abilistic version of anonymity by using information theory, which is computed
using regular expression. In this paper, Crowds Protocol is used as an exam-
ple. Actions are separated into secret and observable in the general interactive
probabilistic information hiding systems. Secret and observable actions can in-
terleave and influence each other. In [87], the authors also studied the problem
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of information hiding in systems characterized by the presence of randomization
and concurrency.
7.2 Enterprise Information Security Technology
Petri nets have been used for the verification of security requirement [88], for spec-
ification of workflows [10], and for security analysis of security policies including
Discretionary Access Control policies [89], Mandatory Access Control policies
[75; 76; 77], and Role Based Acces Control policies [90; 91]. In [92], the authors
used coloured timed Petri nets to implement a workflow authorization model.
They used Petri nets to ensure synchronization between authorization flow and
the workflow so that subject gain access to the required objects only during the
execution of the specific task. Each task is specified with a time interval during
which the task must be executed. In [89], the author used Petri nets to analyse
dynamic access control in workflow systems. The author proposed assigning a
local matrix to each transition to grant rights to subjects (that will execute the
transition) only to data being consumed or produced by the transition. When a
transition is enabled, subjects have only the access rights which are needed for
the execution of this transition. In [75], the author showed how to use Petri nets
in order to analyse the information flow in a workflow system where authoriza-
tions are granted according to the Bell-LaPadula’ model. During the analysis, the
objects are assigned all possible security levels in order to enumerate all model
states. In [93], the authors proposed a different way to make a system security
analysis under Bell-LaPadula’s model, by using CPN. The analysis is based on
the reachability graph exploration in order to verify some security attributes. In
[59], the author proposed a formal model to analyse the system risk. This paper
formalized the threats and their impact in the organization. However, [59] does
not consider the location of users and their behaviour.
Information security researcher has proposed some methods for formally ad-
dressing the problem of data resource security. In [94], the SCRP process calculus
is proposed to analyse data resources in different locations. The environment in
which the system resides has a stochastic representation using a variety of prob-
ability distributions, and a tool is provided to allow one to animate the model as
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a discrete event simulation. Such a tool can help an organization to track data
resources across different locations. The resulting methodology has been applied
to a number of security scenarios, including vulnerability management [95], USB
stick usage [96], and identity management [97]. However, the existing research
did not involve user behaviours, and the status of data resources in different loca-
tions. Moreover, the tool represents an environment in a stochastic way, using a
wide range of probability distributions and queue-like data structures. This can
make it very difficult to analyse the risk exposure associated with the choice of
information security technologies and policies, as well as the ways in which the
threat environment might exploit different levels of risk exposure.
Information security researchers proposed various methods for addressing se-
curity investment problems. In [95; 98], the authors used mathematical models
and stochastic simulations to examine the effectiveness of security operation pro-
cesses and protection mechanisms. In [96], the authors proposed to use economic
models based on trade-off between information confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability to assess the effectiveness and value of security investment of a system.
However, none of them considered the cost on the administrators in the infor-
mation help desk and the non-productive time (NPT) in the organization. In
[57], the authors proposed stochastic Petri nets that can be used to analyse the
productivity loss by implementing information security technologies. However,
the measurement of the productivity loss is not clear in this study.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Works
8.1 Conclusions
In this Thesis, we analysed the security properties in distributed system. We have
studied the information flow security in the cloud computing system, and the data
and productivity loss in organizations. The work contained in this Thesis can be
summarized as follows.
We have proposed a flow-sensitive security model for cloud computing systems
and a security lattice was used to analyse the entities in the system. The opacity
and observation of the model were analysed, and probabilistic models proposed
to quantify a system’s observable behaviour under different security preserving
mechanisms. Based on the probabilistic model of opacity, we proposed five alter-
native definitions of probabilistic opacity for computing systems, each definition
capturing a different aspect of quantifying the opacity of a security predicate.
We have proposed QEP to quantitatively evaluate the benefits and costs of
implementing information security technologies. EDRM were used as a case
study to illustrate our approach. Staff productivity reduction is quantified by
non-productive time and translated into monetary terms. Security metrics were
defined to measure the impact of EDRM products.
We have formally defined a system model for data resources in the organization
based on the location of different classes of data resources as well as users. The
status of the data resources are divided into different classes to analyse based on
the security policy in the organization. Transition systems are built to track the
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data resources and users in different locations. The modelling help us move form
the debate from discussion of claims made by the information security technology
vendors to a better understanding of the effectiveness of information security
technology.
We have analysed the trade-off between security and performance of the ad-
ministrators when implementing information security technologies. An efficient
solution of the information security system comprising the server and adminis-
trators was analysed using queueing theory. Non-productive time and cost func-
tions for implementing the information security technologies were also proposed.
Stochastic Petri nets models were built to simulate our approach and to evaluate
the accuracy of the approximate solution.
Generally, this Thesis provided theory and modelling guideline to help orga-
nization make information security related decision.
8.2 Future Works
In this Thesis, we proposed to quantitatively analyse the opacity in the comput-
ing system, in this study, we concentrated on the probabilistic behaviour of the
system. However, real world system allow input and output, and the behave as an
interactive system. Therefore, in the future we would consider to quantitatively
analyse of opacity in the interactive systems.
The data resources system we proposed concentrated on dynamic behaviour of
data resources and users in different locations, in the future, based on the model
we proposed, we would analyse how the threat environment can exploit different
levels of risk exposure, in addition, we would analyse the threat associated with
the implementing of information security technologies, especially looking at how
much data get left in exposure places.
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